China's little secret about Korea
By Haesook Chae | Special Contributor
Posted March 3, 2003
Orlando, Sentinel
[ok lets have a fun debate on this one, monkies]
Why won't China rein in North Korea in the current
nuclear crisis? The answer lies in Beijing's secret
goal of getting U.S. troops off the peninsula.
The prevailing understanding on China is fundamentally
flawed. The consensus is that China shares common
interests with the United States and nations in the
region in denuclearizing North Korea. Therefore, it
ought to play an active and leading role in resolving
the crisis, especially because Beijing seems to have
the most leverage over North Korea.
Much to the disappointment of the United States,
however, China has excused itself from the "relevant
parties." Beijing insists that this is really a matter
exclusively between the United States and North Korea.
Furthermore, China does not believe that the
U.S.-North Korean dialogue ought to include the United
Nations; Beijing has vociferously opposed efforts to
bring in the world body to bear on the issue. The
question is, why?
The key to understanding China's behavior is realizing
that exclusively bilateral talks could produce what
China secretly craves: the removal of the U.S.
military presence from the Korean peninsula.
Ejection of the U.S. military presence is an essential
first step toward China's ultimate long-term goals:
reunification with Taiwan and reassertion as the
dominant regional power.
After a U.S. withdrawal, China would be likely to find
two friendly Koreas on its southern border. Post-Cold
War South Korea is no longer a hostile country but an
important trading partner. And if a united Korea
emerges, it would probably be amicable toward China.
Further, if Japan re-arms and goes nuclear in reaction
to the new circumstances on the Korean peninsula, the
rationale for the U.S. military presence there may be
diminished as well.
In this best-case scenario for China, with American
forces removed from Korea and Japan, Far East
geopolitics would enter a new era. China could
re-assert its historical status as the dominant
regional power and eventually re-absorb Taiwan.
This crisis may well drive the United States off the
Korean peninsula. With this in mind, why should China
help the United States to maintain its military
presence in South Korea by pressuring North Korea to
give up nuclear weapons?
That China appears constrained by anxieties over the
potential flood of starving refugees that would be
created by North Korea's economic collapse only serves
as a cover for China to prop up North Korea's
bargaining position. China's sales of a key chemical
ingredient for nuclear weapons development to North
Korea, as recently as December, should be understood
within this context. China wants North Korea to
maintain its strong leverage in any bilateral talks
with the United States.
Only when viewed from this perspective are China's
inaction and stubborn insistence on direct talks
between Pyongyang and Washington comprehensible;
indeed, it is a profound and brilliant strategy.
Haesook Chae is an assistant professor in the
political science department of Baldwin-Wallace
College in Ohio. He wrote this for the Los Angeles
Times, a Tribune Publishing newspaper.
By Haesook Chae | Special Contributor
Posted March 3, 2003
Orlando, Sentinel
[ok lets have a fun debate on this one, monkies]
Why won't China rein in North Korea in the current
nuclear crisis? The answer lies in Beijing's secret
goal of getting U.S. troops off the peninsula.
The prevailing understanding on China is fundamentally
flawed. The consensus is that China shares common
interests with the United States and nations in the
region in denuclearizing North Korea. Therefore, it
ought to play an active and leading role in resolving
the crisis, especially because Beijing seems to have
the most leverage over North Korea.
Much to the disappointment of the United States,
however, China has excused itself from the "relevant
parties." Beijing insists that this is really a matter
exclusively between the United States and North Korea.
Furthermore, China does not believe that the
U.S.-North Korean dialogue ought to include the United
Nations; Beijing has vociferously opposed efforts to
bring in the world body to bear on the issue. The
question is, why?
The key to understanding China's behavior is realizing
that exclusively bilateral talks could produce what
China secretly craves: the removal of the U.S.
military presence from the Korean peninsula.
Ejection of the U.S. military presence is an essential
first step toward China's ultimate long-term goals:
reunification with Taiwan and reassertion as the
dominant regional power.
After a U.S. withdrawal, China would be likely to find
two friendly Koreas on its southern border. Post-Cold
War South Korea is no longer a hostile country but an
important trading partner. And if a united Korea
emerges, it would probably be amicable toward China.
Further, if Japan re-arms and goes nuclear in reaction
to the new circumstances on the Korean peninsula, the
rationale for the U.S. military presence there may be
diminished as well.
In this best-case scenario for China, with American
forces removed from Korea and Japan, Far East
geopolitics would enter a new era. China could
re-assert its historical status as the dominant
regional power and eventually re-absorb Taiwan.
This crisis may well drive the United States off the
Korean peninsula. With this in mind, why should China
help the United States to maintain its military
presence in South Korea by pressuring North Korea to
give up nuclear weapons?
That China appears constrained by anxieties over the
potential flood of starving refugees that would be
created by North Korea's economic collapse only serves
as a cover for China to prop up North Korea's
bargaining position. China's sales of a key chemical
ingredient for nuclear weapons development to North
Korea, as recently as December, should be understood
within this context. China wants North Korea to
maintain its strong leverage in any bilateral talks
with the United States.
Only when viewed from this perspective are China's
inaction and stubborn insistence on direct talks
between Pyongyang and Washington comprehensible;
indeed, it is a profound and brilliant strategy.
Haesook Chae is an assistant professor in the
political science department of Baldwin-Wallace
College in Ohio. He wrote this for the Los Angeles
Times, a Tribune Publishing newspaper.
absurd is a form of uncomfortable humor.
Alas, they cannot do a pre-emptive on NK for two reasons -- short-term: NK has a few nukes and would drop them. Range is too short to stop them so, what?, a third of Japan would be toast. Long-term: China won't allow a fully militarized Japan... that's where WWIII starts.
ride.
