http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/06/09/MNG7GD5RNH1.DTL
Cripes...Lodi is only about 2hrs from San Jose.
Cripes...Lodi is only about 2hrs from San Jose.
Al-Queda trained terror-dude jailed in Lodi, CA
- Thread starter Damn True
- Start date
The following: "According to a seven-page FBI affidavit, Hamid Hayat, after failing a lie- detector test, admitted that he had spent six months in an al Qaeda-run camp in Pakistan where he trained to "kill Americans"
....is far more than enough to warrant an arrest. Not necessarily conviction, but an arguement could easilly be made for intent or conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism.
....is far more than enough to warrant an arrest. Not necessarily conviction, but an arguement could easilly be made for intent or conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism.
Isn't this on the same lines of how our "freedom" works?Changleen said:On these standards any American who has ever been in the army or a rifle range and travels to a Arab country would also be arrested by that country for 'terrorism'.
If I had the patience to read the story, I would be more than happy to offer something worthwhile to this thread. Maybe I'll do it later...
He went to a rifle range in Pakistan. He shot at pictures of George Bush. He's clearly not a 'terrorist' and the Feds themselves say they have absolutley no evidence he was even thinking about perpitrating an act of terror. What did you arrest him for again?
Clearly? C'mon, pull your head out.
Are you that naieve, or are you so blinded by your hatred for all things American that you are unable to see why the Fed's can and should detain this clown for questioning?
If you buy a fishing licence it is a fair bet that you have an intent to go fishing.
If you attend welding school it is a fair bet that you have an intent to weld.
If you purchase 20lbs of weed, a scale, and a case of baggies it is a fair bet that you have an intent to sell the weed.
If you fly 1/2 way around the world and attend an Al Queda terrorist training camp it is a fair bet that you have an intent to put some of that training to work. He sure as hell wasn't just on a vacation.
In the United States, intent to comit a capitol crime is probable cause for arrest and conviction.
Are you that naieve, or are you so blinded by your hatred for all things American that you are unable to see why the Fed's can and should detain this clown for questioning?
If you buy a fishing licence it is a fair bet that you have an intent to go fishing.
If you attend welding school it is a fair bet that you have an intent to weld.
If you purchase 20lbs of weed, a scale, and a case of baggies it is a fair bet that you have an intent to sell the weed.
If you fly 1/2 way around the world and attend an Al Queda terrorist training camp it is a fair bet that you have an intent to put some of that training to work. He sure as hell wasn't just on a vacation.
In the United States, intent to comit a capitol crime is probable cause for arrest and conviction.
Changleen said:
His words, not the FBI's.
I think you, in fact are being blinded by your hatred of all things un-american in this case...Damn True said:
Yes, but..
Please just think about what you said for a moment. Who decided that this was an "Al Queda terrorist training camp"? The Feds. How do you know he wasn't on vacation and decided to go shoot some stuff? You don't.
Yes, and as we have already said, the Feds themselves have said they have no evidence he intended to do so.
Changleen said:
The affidavit says Hayat, a U.S. citizen, told interrogators that he wanted to carry out his attacks in the United States.
Did you somehow miss that part, or do just have selective attention deficit disorder? When you do your knee-jerk anti-American thing all the time, you just reduce the impact of anything insightful you might happen to say.
Um, yeah. Changleen, you're really grasping here. While the dude, if the charges are true (which will pan out in a trial) was probably a minor player, there are ALL sorts of things he can and should be charged with (again, if there's sufficient evidence). Treason being one...that's providing "aid and comfort" to the enemy...you're certainly aiding enemies of the US by training in a camp run by those whose stated goal is bringing down the US government.
It's not the pinnacle of the 'war on terror,' (a term which still chafes me); it's minor at best and irrelevant at worst, but still needs to happen. I just don't think it's worth all the gloating we're going to do over it.
It's not the pinnacle of the 'war on terror,' (a term which still chafes me); it's minor at best and irrelevant at worst, but still needs to happen. I just don't think it's worth all the gloating we're going to do over it.
wait... about the "treason" charge...
thats a bit of a double standard... why any american that serves on a foreign army (israel) isnt charged with "treason" in an strict sense???
or what about americans that go an serve/train in some haredi anti-zionist organizations in israel?? (which could be seen as serving for an organization against an anti-US-ally)
thats a bit of a double standard... why any american that serves on a foreign army (israel) isnt charged with "treason" in an strict sense???
or what about americans that go an serve/train in some haredi anti-zionist organizations in israel?? (which could be seen as serving for an organization against an anti-US-ally)
On the basis of the information quoted there is clearly evidence that he was thinking about it.Changleen said:
Whether thinking about something should be considered a crime is a different discussion but he clearly was. Otherwise his statement makes no sense.
Do you actually bother to read anything?Changleen said:
These are the relevant words (in order):
quoted thinking whether crime different discussion
Apropos your post:
Still, like they said, there is zero evidence he was actually trying to pull anything, or even thinking of it.
Relevant words from your post:
zero evidence thinking
It appears that there is zero evidence of you thinking.
Please point out where I failed to try and understand that you said there was no evidence of the guy thinking of carrying out terrorist attacks in the US. If you can I will gladly try further to understand.Changleen said:
Yes, hence my statement: 'Whether thinking about something should be considered a crime is a different discussion '.Changleen said:
However, you stated 'there is zero evidence he was actually trying to pull anything, or even thinking of it'
I merely pointed out that he had in fact been thinking of it.
Whilst we clearly agree that it is dubious whether thinking about something should be considered a crime that was not what the post was about and that is the point you missed entirely.
His very actions in training at the camp constitute a crime under US law.Changleen said:
Alexis, no one said anything about Israel because Israel isn't considered an enemy of the US. Al-Queada is a different story. You don't go for treason charges serving in the Aussie army, either. It's not 'foreign' that's the key; it's 'enemy of the US.'
MD
PS Since I'm not a lawyer, maybe I'm wrong...here's a link we can examine.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/article03/24.html
Section 3. Treason
Clause 1. Definition and Limitations
Treason
The treason clause is a product of the awareness of the Framers of the ''numerous and dangerous excrescences'' which had disfigured the English law of treason and was therefore intended to put it beyond the power of Congress to ''extend the crime and punishment of treason.'' 1283 The debate in the Convention, remarks in the ratifying conventions, and contemporaneous public comment make clear that a restrictive concept of the crime was imposed and that ordinary partisan divisions within political society were not to be escalated by the stronger into capital charges of treason, as so often had happened in England. 1284
Thus, the Framers adopted two of the three formulations and the phraseology of the English Statute of Treason enacted in 1350, 1285 but they conspicuously omitted the phrase defining as treason the ''compass[ing] or imagin[ing] the death of our lord the King,'' 1286 under which most of the English law of ''constructive treason'' had been developed. 1287 Beyond limiting the power of Congress to define treason, 1288 the clause also prescribes limitations upon Congress' ability to make proof of the offense easy to establish 1289 and its ability to define punishment. 1290
Levying War
Early judicial interpretation of the meaning of treason in terms of levying war was conditioned by the partisan struggles of the early nineteenth century, in which were involved the treason trials of Aaron Burr and his associates. In Ex parte Bollman, 1291 which involved two of Burr's confederates, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for himself and three other Justices, confined the meaning of levying war to the actual waging of war. ''However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war, and actually to levy war, are distinct offences. The first must be brought into open action by the assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war cannot have been committed. So far has this principle been carried, that . . . it has been determined that the actual enlistment of men to serve against the government does not amount to levying of war.'' Chief Justice Marshall was careful, however, to state that the Court did not mean that no person could be guilty of this crime who had not appeared in arms against the country. ''On the contrary, if it be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors. But there must be an actual assembling of men, for the treasonable purpose, to constitute a levying of war.''
On the basis of these considerations and due to the fact that no part of the crime charged had been committed in the District of Columbia, the Court held that Bollman and Swartwout could not be tried in the District and ordered their discharge. He continued by saying that ''the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases'' and concluded that no conspiracy for overturning the Government and ''no enlisting of men to effect it, would be an actual levying of war.'' 1292
The Burr Trial .--Not long afterward, the Chief Justice went to Richmond to preside over the trial of Burr himself. His ruling 1293 denying a motion to introduce certain collateral evidence bearing on Burr's activities is significant both for rendering the latter's acquittal inevitable and for the qualifications and exceptions made to the Bollman decision. In brief, this ruling held that Burr, who had not been present at the assemblage on Blennerhassett's Island, could be convicted of advising or procuring a levying of war only upon the testimony of two witnesses to his having procured the assemblage. This operation having been covert, such testimony was naturally unobtainable. The net effect of Marshall's pronouncements was to make it extremely difficult to convict one of levying war against the United States short of the conduct of or personal participation in actual hostilities. 1294
Aid and Comfort to the Enemy
The Cramer Case .--Since the Bollman case, the few treason cases which have reached the Supreme Court were outgrowths of World War II and have charged adherence to enemies of the United States and the giving of aid and comfort. In the first of these, Cramer v. United States, 1295 the issue was whether the ''overt act'' had to be ''openly manifest treason'' or if it was enough if, when supported by the proper evidence, it showed the required treasonable intention. 1296 The Court in a five- to-four opinion by Justice Jackson in effect took the former view holding that ''the two-witness principle'' interdicted ''imputation of incriminating acts to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of a single witness,'' 1297 even though the single witness in question was the accused himself. ''Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses,'' 1298 Justice Jackson asserted. Justice Douglas in a dissent, in which Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black and Reed concurred, contended that Cramer's treasonable intention was sufficiently shown by overt acts as attested to by two witnesses each, plus statements made by Cramer on the witness stand.
The Haupt Case .--The Supreme Court sustained a conviction of treason, for the first time in its history, in 1947 in Haupt v. United States. 1299 Here it was held that although the overt acts relied upon to support the charge of treason--defendant's harboring and sheltering in his home his son who was an enemy spy and saboteur, assisting him in purchasing an automobile, and in obtaining employment in a defense plant--were all acts which a father would naturally perform for a son, this fact did not necessarily relieve them of the treasonable purpose of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Speaking for the Court, Justice Jackson said: ''No matter whether young Haupt's mission was benign or traitorous, known or unknown to the defendant, these acts were aid and comfort to him. In the light of this mission and his instructions, they were more than casually useful; they were aids in steps essential to his design for treason. If proof be added that the defendant knew of his son's instruction, preparation and plans, the purpose to aid and comfort the enemy becomes clear.'' 1300
The Court held that conversation and occurrences long prior to the indictment were admissible evidence on the question of defendant's intent. And more important, it held that the constitutional requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act or confession in open court does not operate to exclude confessions or admissions made out of court, where a legal basis for the conviction has been laid by the testimony of two witnesses of which such confessions or admissions are merely corroborative. This relaxation of restrictions surrounding the definition of treason evoked obvious satisfaction from Justice Douglas who saw in the Haupt decision a vindication of his position in the Cramer case. His concurring opinion contains what may be called a restatement of the law of treason and merits quotation at length:
''As the Cramer case makes plain, the overt act and the intent with which it is done are separate and distinct elements of the crime. Intent need not be proved by two witnesses but may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the overt act. But if two witnesses are not required to prove treasonable intent, two witnesses need not be required to show the treasonable character of the overt act. For proof of treasonable intent in the doing of the overt act necessarily involves proof that the accused committed the overt act with the knowledge or understanding of its treasonable character.
''The requirement of an overt act is to make certain a treasonable project has moved from the realm of thought into the realm of action. That requirement is undeniably met in the present case, as it was in the case of Cramer.
''The Cramer case departed from those rules when it held that 'The two-witness principle is to interdict imputation of incriminat ing acts to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of a single witness.' 325 U.S. p. 35. The present decision is truer to the constitutional definition of treason when it forsakes that test and holds that an act, quite innocent on its face, does not need two witnesses to be transfomred into a incriminating one.'' 1301
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/article03/24.html
Section 3. Treason
Clause 1. Definition and Limitations
Treason
The treason clause is a product of the awareness of the Framers of the ''numerous and dangerous excrescences'' which had disfigured the English law of treason and was therefore intended to put it beyond the power of Congress to ''extend the crime and punishment of treason.'' 1283 The debate in the Convention, remarks in the ratifying conventions, and contemporaneous public comment make clear that a restrictive concept of the crime was imposed and that ordinary partisan divisions within political society were not to be escalated by the stronger into capital charges of treason, as so often had happened in England. 1284
Thus, the Framers adopted two of the three formulations and the phraseology of the English Statute of Treason enacted in 1350, 1285 but they conspicuously omitted the phrase defining as treason the ''compass[ing] or imagin[ing] the death of our lord the King,'' 1286 under which most of the English law of ''constructive treason'' had been developed. 1287 Beyond limiting the power of Congress to define treason, 1288 the clause also prescribes limitations upon Congress' ability to make proof of the offense easy to establish 1289 and its ability to define punishment. 1290
Levying War
Early judicial interpretation of the meaning of treason in terms of levying war was conditioned by the partisan struggles of the early nineteenth century, in which were involved the treason trials of Aaron Burr and his associates. In Ex parte Bollman, 1291 which involved two of Burr's confederates, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for himself and three other Justices, confined the meaning of levying war to the actual waging of war. ''However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war, and actually to levy war, are distinct offences. The first must be brought into open action by the assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war cannot have been committed. So far has this principle been carried, that . . . it has been determined that the actual enlistment of men to serve against the government does not amount to levying of war.'' Chief Justice Marshall was careful, however, to state that the Court did not mean that no person could be guilty of this crime who had not appeared in arms against the country. ''On the contrary, if it be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors. But there must be an actual assembling of men, for the treasonable purpose, to constitute a levying of war.''
On the basis of these considerations and due to the fact that no part of the crime charged had been committed in the District of Columbia, the Court held that Bollman and Swartwout could not be tried in the District and ordered their discharge. He continued by saying that ''the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases'' and concluded that no conspiracy for overturning the Government and ''no enlisting of men to effect it, would be an actual levying of war.'' 1292
The Burr Trial .--Not long afterward, the Chief Justice went to Richmond to preside over the trial of Burr himself. His ruling 1293 denying a motion to introduce certain collateral evidence bearing on Burr's activities is significant both for rendering the latter's acquittal inevitable and for the qualifications and exceptions made to the Bollman decision. In brief, this ruling held that Burr, who had not been present at the assemblage on Blennerhassett's Island, could be convicted of advising or procuring a levying of war only upon the testimony of two witnesses to his having procured the assemblage. This operation having been covert, such testimony was naturally unobtainable. The net effect of Marshall's pronouncements was to make it extremely difficult to convict one of levying war against the United States short of the conduct of or personal participation in actual hostilities. 1294
Aid and Comfort to the Enemy
The Cramer Case .--Since the Bollman case, the few treason cases which have reached the Supreme Court were outgrowths of World War II and have charged adherence to enemies of the United States and the giving of aid and comfort. In the first of these, Cramer v. United States, 1295 the issue was whether the ''overt act'' had to be ''openly manifest treason'' or if it was enough if, when supported by the proper evidence, it showed the required treasonable intention. 1296 The Court in a five- to-four opinion by Justice Jackson in effect took the former view holding that ''the two-witness principle'' interdicted ''imputation of incriminating acts to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of a single witness,'' 1297 even though the single witness in question was the accused himself. ''Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses,'' 1298 Justice Jackson asserted. Justice Douglas in a dissent, in which Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black and Reed concurred, contended that Cramer's treasonable intention was sufficiently shown by overt acts as attested to by two witnesses each, plus statements made by Cramer on the witness stand.
The Haupt Case .--The Supreme Court sustained a conviction of treason, for the first time in its history, in 1947 in Haupt v. United States. 1299 Here it was held that although the overt acts relied upon to support the charge of treason--defendant's harboring and sheltering in his home his son who was an enemy spy and saboteur, assisting him in purchasing an automobile, and in obtaining employment in a defense plant--were all acts which a father would naturally perform for a son, this fact did not necessarily relieve them of the treasonable purpose of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Speaking for the Court, Justice Jackson said: ''No matter whether young Haupt's mission was benign or traitorous, known or unknown to the defendant, these acts were aid and comfort to him. In the light of this mission and his instructions, they were more than casually useful; they were aids in steps essential to his design for treason. If proof be added that the defendant knew of his son's instruction, preparation and plans, the purpose to aid and comfort the enemy becomes clear.'' 1300
The Court held that conversation and occurrences long prior to the indictment were admissible evidence on the question of defendant's intent. And more important, it held that the constitutional requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act or confession in open court does not operate to exclude confessions or admissions made out of court, where a legal basis for the conviction has been laid by the testimony of two witnesses of which such confessions or admissions are merely corroborative. This relaxation of restrictions surrounding the definition of treason evoked obvious satisfaction from Justice Douglas who saw in the Haupt decision a vindication of his position in the Cramer case. His concurring opinion contains what may be called a restatement of the law of treason and merits quotation at length:
''As the Cramer case makes plain, the overt act and the intent with which it is done are separate and distinct elements of the crime. Intent need not be proved by two witnesses but may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the overt act. But if two witnesses are not required to prove treasonable intent, two witnesses need not be required to show the treasonable character of the overt act. For proof of treasonable intent in the doing of the overt act necessarily involves proof that the accused committed the overt act with the knowledge or understanding of its treasonable character.
''The requirement of an overt act is to make certain a treasonable project has moved from the realm of thought into the realm of action. That requirement is undeniably met in the present case, as it was in the case of Cramer.
''The Cramer case departed from those rules when it held that 'The two-witness principle is to interdict imputation of incriminat ing acts to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of a single witness.' 325 U.S. p. 35. The present decision is truer to the constitutional definition of treason when it forsakes that test and holds that an act, quite innocent on its face, does not need two witnesses to be transfomred into a incriminating one.'' 1301
The Kawakita Case .--Kawakita v. United States 1302 was decided on June 2, 1952. The facts are sufficiently stated in the following headnote: ''At petitioner's trial for treason, it appeared that originally he was a native-born citizen of the United States and also a national of Japan by reason of Japanese parentage and law. While a minor, he took the oath of allegiance to the United States; went to Japan for a visit on an American passport; and was prevented by the outbreak of war from returning to this country. During the war, he reached his majority in Japan; changed his registration from American to Japanese, showed sympathy with Japan and hostility to the United States; served as a civilian employee of a private corporation producing war materials for Japan; and brutally abused American prisoners of war who were forced to work there. After Japan's surrender, he registered as an American citizen; swore that he was an American citizen and had not done various acts amounting to expatriation; and returned to this country on an American passport.'' The question whether, on this record Kawakita had intended to renounce American citizenship, said the Court, in sustaining conviction, was peculiarly one for the jury and their verdict that he had not so intended was based on sufficient evidence. An American citizen, it continued, owes allegiance to the United States wherever he may reside, and dual nationality does not alter the situation. 1303
Doubtful State of the Law of Treason Today
The vacillation of Chief Justice Marshall between the Bollman 1304 and Burr 1305 cases and the vacillation of the Court in the Cramer 1306 and Haupt 1307 cases leave the law of treason in a somewhat doubtful condition. The difficulties created by the Burr case have been obviated to a considerable extent through the punishment of acts ordinarily treasonable in nature under a different label, 1308 within a formula provided by Chief Justice Marshall himself in the Bollman case. The passage reads: ''Crimes so atrocious as those which have for their object the subversion by violence of those laws and those institutions which have been ordained in order to secure the peace and happiness of society, are not to escape punishment, because they have not ripened into treason. The wisdom of the legislature is competent to provide for the case; and the framers of our Constitution . . . must have conceived it more safe that punishment in such cases should be ordained by general laws, formed upon deliberation, under the influence of no resentments, and without knowing on whom they were to operate, than that it should be inflicted under the influence of those passions which the occasion seldom fails to excite, and which a flexible definition of the crime, or a construction which would render it flexible, might bring into operation.'' 1309
Doubtful State of the Law of Treason Today
The vacillation of Chief Justice Marshall between the Bollman 1304 and Burr 1305 cases and the vacillation of the Court in the Cramer 1306 and Haupt 1307 cases leave the law of treason in a somewhat doubtful condition. The difficulties created by the Burr case have been obviated to a considerable extent through the punishment of acts ordinarily treasonable in nature under a different label, 1308 within a formula provided by Chief Justice Marshall himself in the Bollman case. The passage reads: ''Crimes so atrocious as those which have for their object the subversion by violence of those laws and those institutions which have been ordained in order to secure the peace and happiness of society, are not to escape punishment, because they have not ripened into treason. The wisdom of the legislature is competent to provide for the case; and the framers of our Constitution . . . must have conceived it more safe that punishment in such cases should be ordained by general laws, formed upon deliberation, under the influence of no resentments, and without knowing on whom they were to operate, than that it should be inflicted under the influence of those passions which the occasion seldom fails to excite, and which a flexible definition of the crime, or a construction which would render it flexible, might bring into operation.'' 1309
yup, but thats why i put the 2nd example.MikeD said:
there are americans linked to some haredi anti-zionist organizations... that would mean there are americans on jewish organizations located in israel that are against zionism (which by definition means being against a US-ally), who, at least in their minds, wish/plot to dissamble the zionist state of Israel (regardless of method)...
or about lori berenson, the american girl that belonged to a peruvian guerrilla, and supplied intelligence against "american imperialism"... whose terrorist organization has bombed US targets and US citizens..
Plotting against an ally of the US isn't treason to the US, nor is it a crime under any US law that I know of. Again, I'm not a lawyer or even an amateur.ALEXIS_DH said:
Never heard of Berenson before, but her actions, if substantiated, do violate a number of US laws. Is she walking around free in the US or something? I fail to see how any of this shows how the US is doing the wrong thing in prosecuting the case we're discussing.
MD
In reading the Supreme Court history of treason, the question seems to hinge on whether (I'm assuming the accusations are true...that this man went knowingly to an Al-Queada camp and trained towards a goal of attacking the US) Al-Queada's previous attacks on the US can define it as an 'assemblage of men' in a 'state of war' with the US. The definition of treason does NOT cover 'consipracy to commit' treason, as noted by Chief Justice Marshall.
However, since Al-Queada has, by its own declaration and by all reasonable evidence, repeatedly attacked the US and maintained a state of war with the US, joining Al-Queada or receiving its training means, yourself, entering into a state of war with the US....levying war, that is. You don't have to have participated in an attack or an assault to be considered part of this assemblage of men...you can be in the rank and file awaiting orders. Your act of war towards the US was made when you willingly joined the organization. And the 'assemblage of men' doesn't have to be entirely composed of US citizens; but any US citizens involved *can* be held to the charge of treason.
Similarly, your joining the organization and training towards its goals fits, not to mention the financing of such treason, under the 'aid' portion of 'aid and comfort' to the enemy.
Anyhow, even if treason doesn't hold (which in today's climate, I'm guessing it would), I'm sure there are numerous consipracy charges on which he can be tried.
Again, the embarrassing thing about this is likely to be the extent to which this one individual becomes a national outlet for frustration and anger. As if his capture or prosecution was really all that big of a deal and we're all so much better and safer for it.
To extend this to the larger picture, no, I don't think we can get anywhere near winning the 'war on terror' (gah, that grates to say) through means like this. This isn't how you either eliminate the root causes of the conflict OR simply destroy the enemy's ability and will to make war. But it's a necessary and microcosmic way of defending yourself from actual domestic attack. Just because it won't end the worldwide Islamic insurgency doesn't mean you shouldn't have this guy behind bars.
What, would you rather wait until he DID become part of a violent domestic action? Please don't tell me that this prosecution will go further in destroying the 'hearts and minds' campaign...NOT prosecuting him wouldn't help, either. We'd just be seen as weak and ineffectual, either in never finding him out in the first place, or as unwilling to actually do anything to an enemy we've exposed in our midst. There's a fight on here, whether I like it or not.
(I've erased some of what I wrote in an effort to keep this on the topic, rather than on how to win a fight against a worldwide Islamic anti-western insurgency. I hope you'll join me...although it seems that some of the readers here are unwilling to look at this incident itself, but rather apply their general disagreement with US strategy and foreign policy to this individual case.)
MD
However, since Al-Queada has, by its own declaration and by all reasonable evidence, repeatedly attacked the US and maintained a state of war with the US, joining Al-Queada or receiving its training means, yourself, entering into a state of war with the US....levying war, that is. You don't have to have participated in an attack or an assault to be considered part of this assemblage of men...you can be in the rank and file awaiting orders. Your act of war towards the US was made when you willingly joined the organization. And the 'assemblage of men' doesn't have to be entirely composed of US citizens; but any US citizens involved *can* be held to the charge of treason.
Similarly, your joining the organization and training towards its goals fits, not to mention the financing of such treason, under the 'aid' portion of 'aid and comfort' to the enemy.
Anyhow, even if treason doesn't hold (which in today's climate, I'm guessing it would), I'm sure there are numerous consipracy charges on which he can be tried.
Again, the embarrassing thing about this is likely to be the extent to which this one individual becomes a national outlet for frustration and anger. As if his capture or prosecution was really all that big of a deal and we're all so much better and safer for it.
To extend this to the larger picture, no, I don't think we can get anywhere near winning the 'war on terror' (gah, that grates to say) through means like this. This isn't how you either eliminate the root causes of the conflict OR simply destroy the enemy's ability and will to make war. But it's a necessary and microcosmic way of defending yourself from actual domestic attack. Just because it won't end the worldwide Islamic insurgency doesn't mean you shouldn't have this guy behind bars.
What, would you rather wait until he DID become part of a violent domestic action? Please don't tell me that this prosecution will go further in destroying the 'hearts and minds' campaign...NOT prosecuting him wouldn't help, either. We'd just be seen as weak and ineffectual, either in never finding him out in the first place, or as unwilling to actually do anything to an enemy we've exposed in our midst. There's a fight on here, whether I like it or not.
(I've erased some of what I wrote in an effort to keep this on the topic, rather than on how to win a fight against a worldwide Islamic anti-western insurgency. I hope you'll join me...although it seems that some of the readers here are unwilling to look at this incident itself, but rather apply their general disagreement with US strategy and foreign policy to this individual case.)
MD
As of right now, I believe the two are only being held on charges that they lied to law enforcement officials.
Yeah, that's what they're held on. Given what's in the affradavit, they're just holding them while 1) continuing the investigation against them and expanding it to any other players and 2) working up the exact charges on which to arraign them for the stuff to which they've already admitted. Picking the charges can be tricky...gotta find the ones which are most likely to stick.blt2ride said:
MD
One sleeper cell eliminated... more to go.
Bravo!! Well said.Damn True said:
Understand this.Changleen said:
The action of attending a terrorist training camp shows intent.
He was arrested while attempting to return to the US after attending said training.
More than enough justification under U.S. law (including pre 9/11 statutes) to detain him while under investigation.
That's not really the important thing...*attending* the camp is in itself aligning yourself with and providing aid to a group of people dedicated to and currently conducting armed operations to harm or destroy the government and people of the United States.Damn True said:
It's not just demonstration of intent, it's an actual criminal action in and of itself. Additionally, his US citizenship opens him to the crime of treason.
MD
Edit: Again, this is all supposing that the accusations in the affradavit, aside from the current charge of lying to the feds, hold in court and are sufficient to secure a guilty verdict. Big "ifs" there, but two confessions to that end go a long way towards helping it along. Of course, they're now going to claim coercion.
MikeD said:
You are correct sir.
MikeD said:
Not to worry. I won't get pedantic about minor spelling or grammar gaffs.