Boeing loses the tanker deal!!
- Thread starter MMike
- Start date
I find that prospect strangely titillating......
now it's McCain's fault...
The question needs to be asked, why didn't Boeing base their submission on the 777 rather than the 767? MMike?
According to what Boeing is saying, the Pentagon told them that the 777 was too big. They they moved the goalposts on them. Boeing contends that had they known that the something A330-sized was what they wanted, then OBVIOUSLY they would have quoted a 777....
It was in the Seattle times a couple of days ago
Boeing's tanker bid damaged when Air Force changed criteria, Dicks says
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/boeingaerospace/2004263690_boeinghearing06.html
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/boeingaerospace/2004263690_boeinghearing06.html
http://forums.ifdg.net/lofiversion/index.php/t79.html
Edit: But isn't the 777 a lot bigger than the A330.
Edit: But isn't the 777 a lot bigger than the A330.
Hey idiot 4 posts ago called and said it wants its link back.
Despite all my bluster the T7 is, in my admittedly dilletantish opinion, the finest commercial airplane there is and would be probably the best option. Without looking at the specs I thought the A330 was basically the Airbus answer to the 767, about the same size as far as I can tell. The T7 is quite a bit bigger.
I honestly don't know enough about the 330 to make an A-B comparison. There are also many flavours of each model....767-200, -300 and -400.....777-200, -300, -300ER....Same goes for the A330....so who knows what was being proposed?
Aaaah, the 777-300ER....massive airplane, got me f*cked how fat people can get to the back of it without oxygen.
Boeing needs to make the 666. Flat black and comes with afterburners to char any 'Busses behind it on taxiways.
Oh christ...you lost. Take it like a man!
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2004272638_webtanker10.html
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2004272638_webtanker10.html
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ABPub/2008/03/10/2004273079.pdf
Response to Press Reports Regarding KC-X Following the Air Force’s KC-X decision announcement, press articles have appeared quoting aerospace experts who purport to have insights into why the KC-767 was not chosen. These articles allege that “Northrop Grumman's victory was not a close outcome” and that “Boeing didn't manage to beat Northrop in a single measure of merit.”
Nothing could be further from the truth.
Factor 1 -- Mission Capability
• Boeing scored “Blue (Exceptional) and Low Risk” in this area – the highest possible rating in the most critical “factor” in this competition
• The Air Force assessed Boeing as meeting or exceeding all Key Performance Parameters (thresholds and objectives)
• Indeed, the Air Force evaluated Boeing as having significantly more strengths (discriminators) than the competitor
Therefore, it follows that Boeing 1) received the highest rating possible, 2) met or exceeded all KPP thresholds and objectives, and 3) was graded as having significantly more strengths than the competition
Factor 2 -- Proposal Risk
• Boeing’s proposal risk was rated “Low”
• Surprisingly, the competitor was also rated as low despite the high risk associated with its evolving multi-country, multi-facility, multi-build approach as contrasted with Boeing’s integrated approach to design, build, and certification in existing facilities with experienced personnel
Therefore, it follows that Boeing 1) was low risk, 2) had an integrated and lean build approach, and 3) the competition should have been assessed greater risk for its complex and unproven multi-country build approach.
Factor 3 -- Past Performance
• Boeing’s past performance was rated “Satisfactory”
• Northrop Grumman/Airbus was also rated satisfactory, despite having no relevant tanker experience and having never delivered a tanker with a refueling boom
• Press reports indicate that some of the most relevant programs for Airbus (the KC-30 for Australia and the A-400M) are both significantly over cost and behind schedule
Therefore, it follows that Boeing 1) had satisfactory past performance, and 2) relevant Airbus programs like the Australian KC-30 tanker and the A-400M are struggling.
1 Response to Press Reports Regarding KC-X
Factor 4 -- Cost/Price
• As determined by the RFP, “Most Probable Life Cycle Cost” (MPLCC) was the only measure of cost to be assessed
• The Air Force described the cost visibility information Boeing provided as “unprecedented” and rated Boeing’s MPLCC cost “Reasonable,” “Balanced,” and meeting “Realism” criteria – all the highest ratings a competitor can receive
• As recognized by the Air Force itself in 2002, the significantly bigger A-330 would demand a greater infrastructure investment with dramatically lower operational effectiveness
Therefore, it follows that 1) Boeing’s MPLCC was judged by the Air Force to be realistic,
2) Boeing’s submitted MPLCC were significantly lower than the Air Force adjusted MPLCC costs and, 3) the Air Force adjustments to Boeing MPLCC costs effectively deprived Boeing of the benefits associated with its integrated in-line production approach.
Factor 5 -- Integrated Assessment
• The model used by the Air Force to judge tanker “fleet effectiveness” was developed and is maintained by Northrop Grumman
• The mission scenarios and operational constraints to be used with the model issued in the draft RFP to judge tanker “fleet effectiveness,” were based upon the 2005 Air Mobility Command “Mobility Capabilities Study” (MCS).
• Before and after the RFP release, changes to the model’s parameters occurred so as to allow a “greater variety of aircraft to be considered” – in essence to allow larger aircraft to compete. However the Air Force promised that it would tie the numerical output of the model back to real-world constraints by weighing “insights and observations.”
• The inherent complexities of the model have made its results inconsistent and un-repeatable and its overall operational relevance questionable;
Therefore, 1) Northrop Grumman’s experience with the model was an inherent advantage,
2) changes were made to ensure Airbus’ larger aircraft worked in the model, but there is little evidence that the Air Force used “insights and observations” to tie the model back to real world operational constraints and 3) the model’s accuracy and relevance are debatable.
Conclusion
Boeing submitted a strong and extremely competitive proposal. In assessing the critical factor of Mission Capability, Boeing was given the highest ratings and evaluated by the Air Force as having significantly more strengths (discriminators) than Northrop Grumman/Airbus. The Air Force modified the Northrop Grumman analytical model before and after issuance of the RFP to enable competition and to allow a larger tanker to compete. In the end, the “leveling” of the competition and subjective assessments of the two proposals seems to have led the Air Force to select a larger, more expensive and operationally limited KC-30 tanker despite the fact that both Air Force requirements and the KC-X RFP call for a medium-sized tanker to replace the
KC-135.
2
Response to Press Reports Regarding KC-X Following the Air Force’s KC-X decision announcement, press articles have appeared quoting aerospace experts who purport to have insights into why the KC-767 was not chosen. These articles allege that “Northrop Grumman's victory was not a close outcome” and that “Boeing didn't manage to beat Northrop in a single measure of merit.”
Nothing could be further from the truth.
Factor 1 -- Mission Capability
• Boeing scored “Blue (Exceptional) and Low Risk” in this area – the highest possible rating in the most critical “factor” in this competition
• The Air Force assessed Boeing as meeting or exceeding all Key Performance Parameters (thresholds and objectives)
• Indeed, the Air Force evaluated Boeing as having significantly more strengths (discriminators) than the competitor
Therefore, it follows that Boeing 1) received the highest rating possible, 2) met or exceeded all KPP thresholds and objectives, and 3) was graded as having significantly more strengths than the competition
Factor 2 -- Proposal Risk
• Boeing’s proposal risk was rated “Low”
• Surprisingly, the competitor was also rated as low despite the high risk associated with its evolving multi-country, multi-facility, multi-build approach as contrasted with Boeing’s integrated approach to design, build, and certification in existing facilities with experienced personnel
Therefore, it follows that Boeing 1) was low risk, 2) had an integrated and lean build approach, and 3) the competition should have been assessed greater risk for its complex and unproven multi-country build approach.
Factor 3 -- Past Performance
• Boeing’s past performance was rated “Satisfactory”
• Northrop Grumman/Airbus was also rated satisfactory, despite having no relevant tanker experience and having never delivered a tanker with a refueling boom
• Press reports indicate that some of the most relevant programs for Airbus (the KC-30 for Australia and the A-400M) are both significantly over cost and behind schedule
Therefore, it follows that Boeing 1) had satisfactory past performance, and 2) relevant Airbus programs like the Australian KC-30 tanker and the A-400M are struggling.
1 Response to Press Reports Regarding KC-X
Factor 4 -- Cost/Price
• As determined by the RFP, “Most Probable Life Cycle Cost” (MPLCC) was the only measure of cost to be assessed
• The Air Force described the cost visibility information Boeing provided as “unprecedented” and rated Boeing’s MPLCC cost “Reasonable,” “Balanced,” and meeting “Realism” criteria – all the highest ratings a competitor can receive
• As recognized by the Air Force itself in 2002, the significantly bigger A-330 would demand a greater infrastructure investment with dramatically lower operational effectiveness
Therefore, it follows that 1) Boeing’s MPLCC was judged by the Air Force to be realistic,
2) Boeing’s submitted MPLCC were significantly lower than the Air Force adjusted MPLCC costs and, 3) the Air Force adjustments to Boeing MPLCC costs effectively deprived Boeing of the benefits associated with its integrated in-line production approach.
Factor 5 -- Integrated Assessment
• The model used by the Air Force to judge tanker “fleet effectiveness” was developed and is maintained by Northrop Grumman
• The mission scenarios and operational constraints to be used with the model issued in the draft RFP to judge tanker “fleet effectiveness,” were based upon the 2005 Air Mobility Command “Mobility Capabilities Study” (MCS).
• Before and after the RFP release, changes to the model’s parameters occurred so as to allow a “greater variety of aircraft to be considered” – in essence to allow larger aircraft to compete. However the Air Force promised that it would tie the numerical output of the model back to real-world constraints by weighing “insights and observations.”
• The inherent complexities of the model have made its results inconsistent and un-repeatable and its overall operational relevance questionable;
Therefore, 1) Northrop Grumman’s experience with the model was an inherent advantage,
2) changes were made to ensure Airbus’ larger aircraft worked in the model, but there is little evidence that the Air Force used “insights and observations” to tie the model back to real world operational constraints and 3) the model’s accuracy and relevance are debatable.
Conclusion
Boeing submitted a strong and extremely competitive proposal. In assessing the critical factor of Mission Capability, Boeing was given the highest ratings and evaluated by the Air Force as having significantly more strengths (discriminators) than Northrop Grumman/Airbus. The Air Force modified the Northrop Grumman analytical model before and after issuance of the RFP to enable competition and to allow a larger tanker to compete. In the end, the “leveling” of the competition and subjective assessments of the two proposals seems to have led the Air Force to select a larger, more expensive and operationally limited KC-30 tanker despite the fact that both Air Force requirements and the KC-X RFP call for a medium-sized tanker to replace the
KC-135.
2
My take is that my BS meter had an aneurysm. It just reads like kernels of corn plucked from last night's steaming curler.
I dunno....if the Lazy B really DID have the goal posts moved on them, then I guess they are right to be pissed. But who knows how it when down.....
The local papers' article (from Associated Press) had no mention of EADS in it at all.
I find the Seattle Times to be the best for these types of things. They are pretty airplane savvy.
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2008043091_tankercontract100.html
I check the S/T every day.
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2008043091_tankercontract100.html
I check the S/T every day.
http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/industries/government/pentagon-cancels--billion-air-force-tanker-contract-competition/
apparently the air force got confused and decided to trash the whole thing and start over.
apparently the air force got confused and decided to trash the whole thing and start over.