Oh don't get me wrong - I have every faith they'll fuck things up in multiple ways.
Donald Trump’s Presidency 2017 - 2021 AND 2025-202X
That's no way to talk about your new Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms cabinet pick!
geezerdown
Realizing Pesqueezer would’ve been a better portmanteau
Well, geezer like me, I’m gonna call you ’BranDown‘.
“Full Circle”.
Brandown and Coffee.
Narrator: Ironically, every single one of the owners of all these construction businesses voted for Trump.
So what are the odds that they hire immigrants to build the detention centers and staff them ? Also ICE will need thousands of new agents. I can see Steven Miller seething with rage when he realizes he's created a perpetual immigration employment machine.
Also, how do 48% oppose tariffs but only 37% say it’s not a priority to put tariffs on imported goods?
I’m curious how the questions were asked.
I’m curious how the questions were asked.
You can’t have a functioning democracy with a plebiscite of sub-morons.
It seems a feature, not a bug. Without a population that agrees following experts is the way, and on what an expert is, then how could you get leadership that didn’t appeal to the lowest common denominator? I’m almost certain that if everyone was an Ivy League graduate then there’d still be a class of relative “morons” (BS vs. PhD) and a democracy would still result in conflicts and differences of opinions that would make selecting a leader a headache.
Of course a democratically elected leader has to, almost by definition, appeal to the lowest common denominator, and "morons" are always going to be a relative measure.
But there's a difference between people disagreeing about who their leader should be based on different sets of facts or different interpretations of those facts (which happens frequently even among educated people), and people disagreeing based on complete rejection of facts and reality.
A highly educated populace will still disagree about who should be president, and there will still be plenty of educated people who believe dumb things. But it's also true that people with higher education levels tend to be less inclined to believe dumb things. Also more educated people tend to have fewer racist beliefs.
Trump, and the current Republican party in general, has taken advantage of the fact that a big swath of the population is simply not interested in truth, and has no threshold for expertise that extends beyond, "confirms my pre-existing beliefs and/or gives me someone to be angry at."
I don't mind that other people have different opinions than I do - but I very much mind when those opinions are obviously not rooted in any kind of reality.
From a local NZ outlet (Newsroom), based on a local
perspective but pretty relevant to y’all.
China’s robust response to a new Trump term
China is set to strengthen relationships in the Asia-Pacific. Recent discussions in Shanghai provide some insight into what’s likely to be on the table.
Opinion: China’s think-tanks have been busy of late. Since June, they’ve been charged with predicting the outcome of the US presidential election, analysing what it could mean for China, and preparing briefs for the leadership on how it should approach the new administration come January.
On the first question, most predictions in China were for a Trump victory. Many scholars echoed the Fox News critique of the Democratic Party as ‘typical out-of-touch liberals’, instinctively understanding the rightward turn in US politics and correctly gauging the mood of the nation.
On the second question, the view of most scholars was that the new administration means one of two things for China. It will either be bad, or it will be really bad, hence the early prep.
Many scholars argued the incoming administration would not just be an aberration but would instead mark a fundamental shift in US foreign and domestic policy.
This was framed as part of the turbulent shift toward a multipolar order and, to steal a phrase from China, a new era of international politics.
Few spoke of being able to cut a deal. Many hoped for a cooperative relationship, which is the official position, but there was little confidence this would be possible.
On the question of how to respond, the think-tanks were exploring how China can navigate probable tariffs, loose rhetoric, and unpredictable shifts in policy toward China.
Many noted the US had already changed its assessments of and policy toward China, framing China as a peer competitor or a reemergent power, or talking about a shifting balance of power. These scholars expected to see further changes in US policy to try to reverse this trend.
There was widespread concern that the new administration would damage Chinese interests and seek to hobble Chinese growth. They put forth a range of measures to protect Chinese interests.
First, China would likely double its efforts in multilateral institutions. A potential US retreat from the United Nations, climate pacts, and the World Trade Organisation was viewed by scholars as an opportunity for China to seize the initiative in these organisations.
China’s ideas for reforming global governance will present challenges for many countries. China’s proposals are generally illiberal, sympathetic to the security interests of authoritarian regimes such as Russia, and promote a shift in influence from West to East and from North to South.
New Zealand will need to invest a lot more in understanding these moves and forming coalitions of countries to defend rules and interests in multilateral fora as well as finding areas of cooperation with China where it can.
The danger is that New Zealand commentators become distracted by the Trump administration, as they were last time, and ignore China’s efforts to promote ‘true multilateralism’ and the diminution of liberal internationalist rules and norms.
While it’s far easier to follow the theatrics of an English-speaking liberal democracy, we shouldn’t let this diminish our focus on China’s consequential efforts to reform multilateralism.
Second, China will likely remind US businesses of their bottom lines and seek a champion for these interests that is close to Trump.
Announcements of high-ranking positions in the next administration suggest many will view China as a rival. Others reportedly close to Trump will have significant economic interests in China. If Trump initiates the trade remedies that he says he will, then those interests could be harmed and potentially act as a break on Trump’s policies.
The People’s Daily, for example, is already reminding Elon Musk of his lucrative Tesla EV production facilities in China.
The message is simple. Chinese officials have the means and will to ensure any economic pain they feel will also be felt by US businesses and consumers, if it comes to that.
The third response will likely be an effort to strengthen relations with countries in China’s periphery. We’ve already seen improvements in the India-China relationship, efforts to improve relations with South Korea and Japan, and a major push to develop relations with Indonesia and the Global South.
China is unlikely to make the same mistake it made last time when many of its regional relationships deteriorated. It will be pushing countries not to support potential US measures against China and see an opportunity to reverse the progress the Biden administration made developing a more coherent regional response to China.
Chinese scholars see an opportunity to push these countries to do less with a US administration that has positions that could be harder to work with.
This creates new challenges for countries such as New Zealand that have sought to maintain significant economic interests with China while carefully managing challenging aspects of that relationship and simultaneously strengthening economic and security relations with the US.
As in 2016, such a policy could now be challenged from both sides.
perspective but pretty relevant to y’all.
China’s robust response to a new Trump term
China is set to strengthen relationships in the Asia-Pacific. Recent discussions in Shanghai provide some insight into what’s likely to be on the table.
Opinion: China’s think-tanks have been busy of late. Since June, they’ve been charged with predicting the outcome of the US presidential election, analysing what it could mean for China, and preparing briefs for the leadership on how it should approach the new administration come January.
On the first question, most predictions in China were for a Trump victory. Many scholars echoed the Fox News critique of the Democratic Party as ‘typical out-of-touch liberals’, instinctively understanding the rightward turn in US politics and correctly gauging the mood of the nation.
On the second question, the view of most scholars was that the new administration means one of two things for China. It will either be bad, or it will be really bad, hence the early prep.
Many scholars argued the incoming administration would not just be an aberration but would instead mark a fundamental shift in US foreign and domestic policy.
This was framed as part of the turbulent shift toward a multipolar order and, to steal a phrase from China, a new era of international politics.
Few spoke of being able to cut a deal. Many hoped for a cooperative relationship, which is the official position, but there was little confidence this would be possible.
On the question of how to respond, the think-tanks were exploring how China can navigate probable tariffs, loose rhetoric, and unpredictable shifts in policy toward China.
Many noted the US had already changed its assessments of and policy toward China, framing China as a peer competitor or a reemergent power, or talking about a shifting balance of power. These scholars expected to see further changes in US policy to try to reverse this trend.
There was widespread concern that the new administration would damage Chinese interests and seek to hobble Chinese growth. They put forth a range of measures to protect Chinese interests.
First, China would likely double its efforts in multilateral institutions. A potential US retreat from the United Nations, climate pacts, and the World Trade Organisation was viewed by scholars as an opportunity for China to seize the initiative in these organisations.
China’s ideas for reforming global governance will present challenges for many countries. China’s proposals are generally illiberal, sympathetic to the security interests of authoritarian regimes such as Russia, and promote a shift in influence from West to East and from North to South.
New Zealand will need to invest a lot more in understanding these moves and forming coalitions of countries to defend rules and interests in multilateral fora as well as finding areas of cooperation with China where it can.
The danger is that New Zealand commentators become distracted by the Trump administration, as they were last time, and ignore China’s efforts to promote ‘true multilateralism’ and the diminution of liberal internationalist rules and norms.
While it’s far easier to follow the theatrics of an English-speaking liberal democracy, we shouldn’t let this diminish our focus on China’s consequential efforts to reform multilateralism.
Second, China will likely remind US businesses of their bottom lines and seek a champion for these interests that is close to Trump.
Announcements of high-ranking positions in the next administration suggest many will view China as a rival. Others reportedly close to Trump will have significant economic interests in China. If Trump initiates the trade remedies that he says he will, then those interests could be harmed and potentially act as a break on Trump’s policies.
The People’s Daily, for example, is already reminding Elon Musk of his lucrative Tesla EV production facilities in China.
The message is simple. Chinese officials have the means and will to ensure any economic pain they feel will also be felt by US businesses and consumers, if it comes to that.
The third response will likely be an effort to strengthen relations with countries in China’s periphery. We’ve already seen improvements in the India-China relationship, efforts to improve relations with South Korea and Japan, and a major push to develop relations with Indonesia and the Global South.
China is unlikely to make the same mistake it made last time when many of its regional relationships deteriorated. It will be pushing countries not to support potential US measures against China and see an opportunity to reverse the progress the Biden administration made developing a more coherent regional response to China.
Chinese scholars see an opportunity to push these countries to do less with a US administration that has positions that could be harder to work with.
This creates new challenges for countries such as New Zealand that have sought to maintain significant economic interests with China while carefully managing challenging aspects of that relationship and simultaneously strengthening economic and security relations with the US.
As in 2016, such a policy could now be challenged from both sides.
If a dick's length is 10x its girth, can it really be considered "girthy," regardless of its actual measurements?
Perhaps, as someone who is obviously fascinated with contemplating the genitals people are carrying around, Mr. Leeper could offer some insight. He'll have to PM you, though.
consider the counterexample, of someone with a tiny mushroom of a dick, equally broad as it is wide but only, say, an inch and a half in each dimension
that would not be girthy imo. (but I agree that the theoretical 50' tree-dick would not be girthy, either.)
Well, from the point of view of the normal human sized partner, it sure would be intimidatingly girthy.
If I owned a strip club/bbq joint, I’d call it Girthy Gary's Groovy Gals and Smokehouse.
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Trump Refuses to Disclose Who Is Funding His Transition
Donald Trump is the first president-elect not to sign an ethics agreement that sets fundraising limits and transparency.
www.rollingstone.com
It's almost puppet time!Trump Refuses to Disclose Who Is Funding His Transition
Donald Trump is the first president-elect not to sign an ethics agreement that sets fundraising limits and transparency.