[Jr_Bullit]

Okay all - this thread will eventually contain the entirety of my paper....please at least be somewhat constructive in your criticism so I can actually use some of your advice to improve upon the paper (though I can't just delete it...sorry...it's due tomorrow)...

Next post is the intro to the paper. I'll be posting each section as I complete the typing of it... It should all be posted by 4:00pm today. - OH yeah, and it's 30+ pages...so good luck in reading!

 

[Jr_Bullit]

A mentor of mine once told me that a person defines him or herself by two things: The first being their World Views, or belief system that provides them with a sense of meaning and purpose, and colors the way in which they view their world and how they belong to it. World Views often encompass one’s religious beliefs, as well as one’s view of morality and ideals. World Views give one order and purpose to the structure of society and how people interrelate to one another, differences in World Views throughout history have led to violent religious and cultural persecution, repression, and war; the second is their Live Structures, or the series of organizations an individual gives his allegiance to. This can be, for example, one’s family (immediate and extended), one’s community, one’s regional area or group of communities that share similar World Views, and finally one’s nation or state. The order of priority or importance, as well as one’s definition of these Life Structures is dependent upon one’s World Views. However, one’s World Views are often shaped by the Structures and their state of health and unity at the time of one’s development. For example, Life Structures can be churches or religious institutions and these can be both a community structure or a ‘nation’ to an individual, such as the Catholic Church in Europe only a few centuries ago; or Inner-city gangs in the United States who dominate their members’ Life Structures as both a community and a nation. Thus, one cannot exist without the other, the two are joined and inseparable. If, for some reason, one or both should come into question, than an individual is forced to redefine him or herself by replacing the World View or Life Structure that is now doubted. Generally, it is a one large or a sequence of events that cause a person to question their World Views and/or Life Structures. It can be a war, or famine, repression of a person or people, or the gift of knowledge and so on, that can cause an individual to doubt the manner in which they have defined themselves. There is, however, one consistency among World Views and Structures and the manner in which they come into question: the micro or macro event that can cause a single person or an entire population to doubt what they hold as true is almost always brought to pass by human hands.
The process of redefinition can be as violent and bloody as a nation torn by civil war; as liberating as a revolution won by young idealists; as somber and reverent as laying a loved one to rest; or as quiet as an old man contemplating the failing of his most cherished life structure, his own body.
As truly as a single individual defines himself by World Views and Life Structures, so too do those Life Structures define themselves, in their world, by the people who reside within them and by the communities to which they belong. Essentially, we as individuals each define ourselves as a part of a community; and that community while defined by a group of individuals and their common World Views is equally defined by other communities around it; and those communities, generally sharing a common definition of themselves, may combine to make up a nation which is thusly defined by the individuals who reside within as well as by the global community of nations and organizations.
In today’s highly interconnected and global societies, all levels of Life Structures have been and currently are in the process of redefining and recreating themselves. Because of humankind’s insatiable curiosity and rapid technological advancements, a community of nation-states, each having it’s own set of World Views, cultures and peoples, has been thrown together. As is the nature of advancement, some have developed faster and more strongly than others, placing them in an enviable position of power and wealth. This pattern of behavior can be traced to the smallest of structures, where the individual who has the most or is the strongest will fight to keep his or her position while others compete to develop the necessary tools to, if not replace the communal hegemon, then to at least share in the wealth of those who currently sit in power. The process of developing oneself to belong to and/or share in the wealth of a desirable group (a new Life Structure) can often lead to a process of redefining oneself or re-evaluating and questioning one’s current World Views. When a nation chooses to, or is forced by historical and political events, develop itself in order to join and share in the benefits of modern global society, it greatly increases the probability of internal conflict, as not all of the communities and individuals that define the nation’s World Views will agree with or support the process of redefinition in order to successfully participate in global society. In fact, in many cases, the World Views that belong to the dominating group of nations can often be thought to be so extremely offensive and immoral by members of many developing nations, that they will work against (often violently so) their governments efforts to improve their national quality of life if it means participating or supporting today’s modern global society.
What is unfortunate, however, is that change often does not allow for choice on the part of the one who must change. Through things such as exploration, colonization, slavery, and greed the gates to the nation’s of the world were thrust open, their wealth plundered, their land stripped, and their world’s irrevocably changed and now connected to what has become, through trial and error and constant technological growth, global society. This rapid evolution and forced redefinition of societies, whose natural resources are limited or have been stripped, whose populations have grown at enormous rates, and whose national cultural majority oppose the moral precepts on which powerful capitalistic, democratic nations are founded, has led to violent waves of terror and destruction by religious or social fundamentalist groups. The governments of these nation must work to not only meet the qualifications of the powerful states and organizations of global society, but to also protect the populace from violence and improve their quality of life through economic improvement.
In today’s relatively well-informed societies, religious and/or social fundamentalism, of any sort, gains its strength during times when economic and social hardships dramatically affect the foundations of a nation. For the balance of this paper, we will be focusing on the case study of Egypt, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and its president, Hosni Mubarak, and how the current secular regime appears to be successful in containing threats to its authority and violent bursts of terror as it strives to redefine the nation of Egypt in order to ultimately improve the quality of life of the people.

 

[Jr_Bullit]

Before we begin rifling through Egypt’s recent political past to help explain its present, we must first briefly attend to the experience of Islam as a predominant faith and culture, or World View, of the majority of Egyptians, as well as large influencer of the direction of political regimes throughout Egypt’s history. Islam, which can be defined as ‘submission,’ and is built on the root world ‘salaam’ or ‘peace,’ is one of the great world religions. “Born in the desert like it’s two monotheistic predecessors, Judaism and Christianity, Islam proved uncommonly inspiring, carrying with it a small group of nomadic fighters to wide and rapid dominion (Landes, David; The Wealth and Poverty of Nations; p. 392).” The Muslim warrior was doing God’s work, so when, in the beginning of the eleventh century, Christian knights pushed the faithful Muslim’s back and occupied lands once part of the House of Islam, it was viewed as a triumph of evil, and yet set the course for the change in religious and political balance of power that was to ensue through the balance of the millennium. For many centuries this shift in power was concealed by the sustained autonomy of Muslim states. However, beginning with the seventeenth century and the arrival of the British in Mongol India and the inevitable clash of the British Empire with the Ottoman Empire, formerly autonomous Muslim states were faced with the severe and sudden change of their fates.
Though technically considered a part of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt had been ruled for some 260 years by an Aristocracy called Mamelukes (1254-1517). Even after the Ottoman Conquest in 1517, they remained the primary rulers of Egypt until the intrusion of the French under Bonaparte (1798) and the counter-invasion by British Forces. On the heels of the Europeans came a soldier of fortune by the name of Mehemet Ali who made himself the Sultan’s viceroy. In 1811 he placed himself at the head of Egypt by slaughtering the leaders of the Mameluke Aristocracy at a banquet he threw in their honor.
During this period of Mameluke rule, the flow of trade between Europe and Muslim states and the Eastern craftsmen who once supplied Europe with fine cloth, carpets, tapestries and the like in exchange for metal, slaves, and money, was reversing. From the sixteenth century onward, Europe produced the textiles it once purchased, and traded those for fruit, spices, cotton and cereal in the Eastern nations. Paper and silk are good examples of textiles Eastern nations had produced for centuries that the Europeans learned to produce for less cost. In paper the Europeans soon far surpassed their Levantine predecessors and were soon selling large quantities in the East.
David Landes claims that Islam’s greatest mistake was the refusal of the printing press, “which was seen as a potential instrument of sacrilege and heresy (Landes, David; The Wealth and Poverty of Nations; p. 402).” With the resulting intellectual segregation, the balance of economic forces tilted steadily against the Ottoman Empire and in a series of military defeats, completed the shift of power and domination in the region.
Across the Mediterranean, however, Egypt, now under the rule of Mehemet Ali (now stylized Muhammed Ali in Arabic, as against Turkish style), was being developed into what Ali envisioned as a hereditary fiefdom. It encompassed advances in agriculture and industry, new technologies, innovations in schooling, and in its military program. Under his tutelage, Egypt’s cotton production, and overall economic health grew rapidly. It is highly debated why Ali was so successful and yet ultimately failed in his ventures. Whatever the reasons were, in 1838 Britain took decisive action against the growing Egyptian cotton trade and deprived Egypt of tariff barriers and market constraints that were required for the fledgling Egyptian industries to survive in a world of free-trade and competition.
Egypt remained under the protection of the Ottoman Empire until its fall after the First World War. After the collapse of the Empire, Egypt became an independent nation, but ruling authority still resided in the British Occupational Governor, with a figurehead monarch in Cairo. Following the Arab defeat in the Israeli War of Independence in 1948, a group of Egyptian military officers began plotting to overthrow the throne and remove British influence from Egypt permanently. The 1952 Free Officers Revolution effectively eliminated King Farouk from power and established a Revolutionary Command Council as the governing body of Egypt.
The leader of this revolution, a young colonel named Gamal ‘Abd al’ Nasser, began a process whereby Egypt became a truly independent state formed under his idea of Arab Nationalism and the Socialist ideal of government. Nasser became a hero to both the Egyptian people, and the Arab world at large as a symbol of resistance to Western imperialism in the Middle East. During his tenure as President of Egypt, Nasser’s “perfection” would falter in the face of several problems. His courtship with the Soviet Union would mark him as a pariah to Western governments, and to certain elements among his own population. Both the failure of the United Arab Republic and the Arab defeat in the Six Day War against Israel would mark an end to a period of Nasser’s unquestionable power. Under his successor, Anwar al’ Sadat, Egypt would begin to take on very different roles both domestically and internationally.
Mohammed Ahmed Anwar al’ Sadat assumed the presidency of Egypt in 1971, following the death of Nasser. He was immediately made aware of the shadow that his administration would permanently operate under. It seemed the entire Arab world mourned the loss of Nasser. Millions flooded the streets of Cairo to follow his funeral procession. “Nasser left a void that few men could have filled. Sadat had been completely eclipsed by Nasser. Sadat, who was neither a charismatic nor popular leader, lacked political legitimacy. Tellingly, in the early days of his rule, Sadat’s pictures were always seen alongside that of Nasser.” In an attempt to eliminate this fact, the Sadat administration adopted several policies in an effort to detach itself from Nasser’s legacy. Among the more notable of these policies were Sadat’s economic “open door,” or Infitah, and his personal and political use of Islam as a form of legitimacy for his government. It is these policies that have shaped the course of Egyptian politics throughout his rule, and defined the path that his successor would be forced to tread in the following years. Many of these policies are often blamed for the state of Egyptian stagnation and instability it is working to remove itself from, today.
The economic and political policies of the Sadat administration, and those of the succeeding Mubarak regime, as well as the economic and social conditions that existed in Egypt through the 1990s, led to an enormous rise in religious backed opposition in the population. “It is not surprising that when people are weighed down by problems, they turn to religion. This has been true for suffering peoples throughout history, evening in the United States, which reveres a separation of Church and State. Just as the ‘black’ church led a revolution in the United States, the mosques have been doing the same in many parts of the Muslim world (Davis, Joyce; Between Jihad and Salaam; p. xiv).” There are two key differences, however, between the United States’ revolution of the 1950s and the current situation in the Middle East: 1) Black citizens of the United States were considered to be, by the majority of the ‘white’ citizens, second-class members of society, and they were treated as such, while followers of Islam in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East represent the majority of the people, it is simply how they choose to adhere to Islam and in their support (or lack-thereof) of their nations that determines the manner in which they are treated by their government; 2) the movement that grew from the ‘black’ churches, as Davis refers to them, had a policy of non-violence. In contrast, many of the movements that have begun in mosques with Islam as their foundation, are ignited by the doctrine of ‘jihad’, or ‘holy war.’ While the Qu’ran does not support aggressiveness or the starting of hostilities, it fiercely encourages followers to defend themselves and to ‘slay’ persecutors wherever they may be found, as “persecution is worse than slaughter (Qu’ran, Surah 2:190-191).”

 

[Jr_Bullit]

Joyce Davis interviewed a journalist in Cairo named Fahmi Howeidi, who blamed the repressive regime of Egypt for pushing young people into militant organizations. The problems that lead to the viewing of the current regime as a repressive one, stem from the inception of Anwar al’ Sadat as president in 1971. After pledging to continue Nasser’s policies, the new government altered its course towards Sadat’s own agenda. He began by arresting ninety-two “Nasserites,” even those who held high positions in government, on charges of treason. He then continued with the drafting of the 1971 Permanent Constitution, which defined Egypt as a “democratic, socialist state based on the alliance of the working forces of the people.” It further called on Islamic Jurisprudence to be the principle source of legislation in the country with the president defined as the most powerful member of the government. The constitution had one very noticeable difference that helped define Sadat’s rule as separate from that of Nasser, and that was the mention of Islam. Nasser’s rule had been accepted as a secular one, and Sadat used ‘Islam’ as a mean’s of gaining political and popular support.
In 1972 Sadat began a process of economic reform and independence that would later characterize his rule as one that opened Egypt to capitalization. He ordered the removal of all Soviet advisors, opened talks with Saudi Arabia and began rebuilding Egypt’s military strength. In 1973 the Egyptian Army crossed the Suez Canal into the Sinai and began the Ramadan War. While Egypt sustained a military loss, the resulting peace treaty, brokered by the United States, returned control of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.
Immediately following the war, Sadat began his policy of economic reforms, the ‘Infitah.’ This system was to transform the Egyptian economy by consolidating the public sector while simultaneously promoting private sector growth. The effects of the new system were immediate and disastrous. The encouragement of foreign trade resulted in a huge trade deficit, brought on by the importation of intermediate and consumer goods coupled with a drop in overall exports. The socio-economic structure was faced with the emergence of a new upper class, aggravated inflation, and the majority of the economic burden falling on the middle and lower classes.
The ‘Infitah,’ no matter how disastrous, did accomplish one, major goal. It caught the attention of Western powers, who began supplying Egypt with aid in attempts to keep the open-door policy alive. As the largest supplier of aid, the United States utilized its influence to encourage peace between Egypt and Israel, which set in motion a process that culminated in the expulsion of all USSR influence in Egypt and the signing of the 1978 Camp David Accords. Between the singing of the Accords and the subsequent 1979 Treaty of Peace with Israel, Egypt ostracized itself from its Arab neighbors. A summit of Arab leaders was called in Baghdad, Iraq and the majority of Arab states voted to sever all relations with Egypt, Egypt’s membership in the League of Arab States was suspended, and Egypt was removed from its membership in the Islamic Conference and the organization of African Unity, and all loans and financial assistance from Arab states was cut off. Nationalist forces within Egypt declared their opposition to the treaty, and Sadat’s government lost its legitimacy with both its citizens and its neighbors.
The combination of the economic downsizing brought on the Egyptian people by ‘Infitah,’ the courtship of the Untied States and its allies who represented the immoral and powerful West, and finally the treaty with Israel that resulted in the ostracizing of Egypt from its neighbors, brought about the end of Sadat’s regime. On October 6, 1981, Lt. Khalid Islambuli assassinated Sadat. He was both a military officer and a member of the fundamentalist al’ Jihad organization.

 

[Jr_Bullit]

Hosni Mubarak assumed the presidency in 1981 and immediately demonstrated a commitment to gradualism aimed at modifying and preserving the best elements of his predecessors accomplishments. He worked to balance the demands of Islamists with his plans to promote a secular Egyptian state. Under both Sadat and Mubarak, Egypt made noticeable progress in the areas of political and economic reform. Since the inception of Nasser’s single party socialist government in 1954, Egypt has developed itself in an attempt to compete in the modern world. With the assistance of the Soviet Union, and the continuing support of the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Egypt has made strides towards addressing the very real problems of overpopulation, unemployment, and a faltering economy.
Since Sadat’s assassination in 1981, Mubarak has been engaged in an on-again-off-again war with Islamic Fundamentalist groups as a result of the still prevailing (though diminishing) economic, political, and social problems. There are many organizations that fall into the category of Islamic Fundamentalist or Extremist within the state of Egypt. Some no longer exist, others grow rapidly in areas of poverty and slums, and there are many that have most likely never been heard of. Most of the violent groups have stemmed from the oldest, most institutionalized, and purportedly non-violent Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in 1928 by Hassan al’ Banna. It rests on a platform of social and political activism based on al’ Banna’s understanding of the teachings of Islam. Today, it is generally considered a moderate group led by men long past their prime, but remain devoted to reforming their societies and governments to best reflect the teachings of Islam. It is commonly believed that if ever made legal the Brotherhood is the only organization that could pose a threat to Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Most suspect, however, that for all the community support and the non-violent behavior of the Brotherhood, it privately supports and encourages the more radical and violent groups. For this reason, Mubarak continues to staunchily oppose its legitimate participating in government and politics.
One other Islamist group that deserves a brief introduction is the al’ Gamaa al’ Islamiyaa, a a highly volatile and combative group that has claimed ownership over attempts on Mubarak’s life, and admits to being compelled to launch a guerilla war against the current regime, which it strongly believes is highly immoral and panders too much to the capitalist Western society.
Throughout the 1980s the Mubarak regime managed to balance the needs of stability and reform. By carefully opening the political arena to an array of parties and allowing the press greater freedom to criticize government policies as well as individual members of the ruling National Democratic Party, the regime acquired a valuable measure of legitimacy. Upon his succession from Sadat, Mubarak released a number of political prisoners and offered rehabilitation systems for those charged with more serious offenses. The Ummah party was created in 1983 as the sanctioned, Islamically oriented party. Along with this new party, certain restrictions on the Muslim Brotherhood were lifted during the 1980s. Independent Islamists were allowed to participate in elections by allying themselves with other parties. Thus, the Brotherhood ran under the umbrella of the New Wafd party in 1984, and with the Socialist Labor party in 1987. The regime also began to tolerate Islamist dominance in professional associations, such as in various fields of medicine, the press and legal syndicates.
Unfortunately, as Mubarak began to open the political doors to encourage a wider-range of voices in Egypt’s developmental process, the already stagnant and struggling economy faltered. According to the World Bank’s World Development Handbook of 1994 the 1980s and early 1990s could be described as a “lost decade and a half.” The rate of economic growth (GNP per capita) dropped from 7.4 percent in 1981 to 1.8 percent in 1992. Furthermore, the new decade began with the significant fall of Egypt from the World Bank’s group of lower-middle income countries to its grossly-lower income countries. World Bank statistics also indicated a rise in the rate of inflation (from 11.5 percent in 1981 to 21.3 percent by 1989) during this period, as well as a drop of ten percent in the real income of industrial workers. Also of critical importance is the alleged growing gap between rich and poor members of society and the deteriorating economic conditions of lower-income groups.
This rapid decline in Egypt’s already struggling economy led to two things: 1) the decline in the quality of life of the general populace increased the attractiveness of Islamic Fundamentalist organizations who were working hard to undermine and topple the current regime; 2) made the Mubarak regime appear weak and ineffective. As a result, radical Islamist unrest surfaced again, particularly in the Upper Nile Valley and in the Faoyoum Oasis where sheik Omar Abd al’ Rahman had settled. Released from prison after being found not guilty of Sadat’s assassination (he had been accused until Islambuli announced his crime publicly), this ulema-turned-radical resumed his preaching, the central theme of which was the impiety of the state and the necessity of toppling the state in order to install the Islamic state. The radicalized militants who came together and be known as Tanzim al’ Jihad practiced political patience and considered random acts of violence to be useless.
The tactics of al’ Gamaa al’ Islamiyaa were less well structured than the Tanzim al’ Jihand. The al’ Gamaa is a collection of associations and movements directed by self-proclaimed ‘emirs’ in various towns and large villages in Egypt. Accused f being behind the attacks against tourists, harassing the military and police and assassinating the secularist writer Farag Foda in 1992, their political ‘impatience’ expresses itself in incongruous and wild ardor.
During the summer of 1993 the violence of the armed groups affiliated with the al’ Gamaa al’ Islamiyaa and the Tanzim al Jihad increased dramatically and included attempts on the lives of the Ministers of the Interior and Information, and the Prime Minister. Many policemen were assassinated, Copts (Christian Egyptians) were subjected to a ‘special tax’ known as ‘jiziyya’ in return for protection by armed militant Islamists. Attacks on tourists increased dramatically, constraining a two billion to four billion dollar a year industry.
With the intensification of violence, and with the suspicion of quiet support by the Muslim Brotherhood, the state chose to break its unspoken agreement with the Muslim Brotherhood at the end of 1993. The conservative ulemas and Muslim Brothers were publicly denounced as ‘terrorists’ in June of 1994 by the Minister of the Interior.

 

[Jr_Bullit]

1995 – The Pivotal Year:
In 1995 Steve Rodan of the World Press Review wrote an article describing Egypt’s “Terrorist Breeding Ground.” In it, he said that with the current economic climate in Egypt, young people had little to look forward to in life. This, he said, is the reason there is such an increase in Islamic Fundamentalist acts of terrorism. Egypt’s war on terrorism in 1995 was fought on the campuses of universities, in the headquarters of unions and opposition parties, in newspaper offices, and just about anywhere Islamic extremism appears to have a foothold. According to Mr. Rodan, many Egyptians believe that Islam, of the extreme, violent type, grows where poverty grows.
With a population growing at unchecked rates, unemployment levels skyrocketing daily as salaries simultaneously decreased in value and violence increasing with every purported government failing, 1995 was a year when Hosni Mubarak needed to turn is nation around or risk losing his place at Egypt’s head. He needed to make strong headway in two key areas prior to the parliamentary elections designated to be held that November. The first, and most obvious, was the need to stem the tide of violence and bring the Islamist militants under firm control. The second was the need to turn the economy around or risk losing the financial and political support of Western governments and risk losing control of his regime if it continued to fail at maintaining and improving the quality of life of the populace. He would need to achieve both and simultaneously, a careful juggling act that could win him no friends, potentially increase his list of enemies, and possibly self-destruct before ever brought to completion.
In many accounts Mubarak is described as an overly cautious man. He took to heart the mistakes of his predecessor and for the first 12 years of his regime did not appear to make effective changes that would stem the downturn of the Egyptian economy and the steady increase in distrust and violence. But cautious men are often patient men, and Mubarak is also described as that. Additionally he has been depicted as ruthless in pursuit of a course of action and stubborn and strong-willed enough to see a plan through to the end. No one will know if 1995 was Egypt’s pivotal year entirely because of the careful planning and forethought of a careful and patient president, or if it changed the tide of events from then till now entirely as a result of good fortune and luck, or if it was a combination of both. What is known is that through a combination of events, 1995 was the year Egypt slowly began to change course and steer a new path, one that is completely self-determined and truly does not appear to be following in the footsteps of its peers. Below is an account of that year played out:
January of 1995 rang in with the bloodletting of eleven people by Islamic militants, and did not get any cleaner from there. A few days into the new year two men belonging to Islamic Fundamentalist groups stood accused of the stabbing and attempted murder of Nobel Laureate, Naguib Amahfouz. The end of the month saw a clash of Muslims and police that led to the deaths of another eighteen people.
In February several hundred of the Intelligentsia of Egypt publically put their stamp of approval on Mubarak’s violent and fierce response to the terrorist attacks by composing and signing a declaration condemning terrorism and laying blame on several prominent fundamentalist figures and on the al’ Azhou mosque. It was a month of repressive violence, where reporters cheered and jeered at the efforts of the Mubarak regime to control the out-of-control terrorism. In one article by David Hirst and Gill Lusk of “The Guardian” it was predicted that the looming elections could “prove the last chance for the change that every Egyptian is yearning for.”
In the early months of 1995 all reports appeared to say the same thing, that while support was there for the violent repression of the militant extremists that were tearing the nation asunder, to all appearances it did not seem as if the government could stem the tide. As terror stalked the rural villages of the nation and the extremists threatening and attacking anyone who appeared to support the government police or military, a dark and heavy pall seemed to hang over the nation. One article in the Economist in early February pleaded with the Mubarak regime to turn back, linking the bloodstained crackdowns on the moderate Muslim Brotherhood as well as the violent al’ Gamaa al’ Islamiayaa to the violent civil war raging in Algeria. The regime’s licensed thugs tramped through the countryside burning sugar plantations to the ground and bulldozing homes and properties where members of the militant groups were thought to have been hiding. Families of wanted men were arrested, and by some accounts tortured. Young people were detained and questioned, and eventually twenty-eight of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leading members, including senior officials of the Doctor’s Union, were arrested. Human Rights organizations reported that Egypt’s prisons were packed with militant Islamists (upwards of 20,000 people according to the Economist), and that torture was commonplace. February also saw the successful avoidance of yet another assassination attempt by Hosni Mubarak.

 

[Jr_Bullit]

In March of 1995 the first articles of economic reform efforts of the year began to trickle through the newswire in conjunction with continuing reports of Mubarak’s repression of the Islamic Fundamentalists. The United States and Egypt announced a collaborative effort to boost the Egyptian economy, and Egypt declared an amount of $300 million was to be allocated to renovate and expand its textile mills. In an International Gas report it was found that Egypt’s potential production of Natural Gas and Oil could rival that of Libya and Algeria.
April and May saw the continuation of large-scale economic reform decisions being implemented by Mubarak and gossiped about by the rest of the world. The Financial Times mused about the willingness of the Mubarak regime to follow through on the complete sale of a state asset via the Cairo Stock Exchange. The first state-owned company to be sold and privatized was Kabo, a weaving and knitting firm. It represented the second stage of an economic reform program agreed to with foreign aid donors and international organizations in 1991. The risk faced by the Egyptian government in privatizing too rapidly or too great an extent was massive unemployment or an inflation increase, an error Mubarak’s predecessor Sadat had made that had ultimately led to his, and his regime’s demise. Later, David Gardner, also of the Financial Times, debated the merits of Mubarak’s cautious and slow movement towards privatization. He felt that the scale of Egypt’s problems necessitated haste. Gardner complimented Mubarak’s introduction of macro-economic reforms and modernized infrastructure yet criticized his hesitation over the privatization of the enormous amounts of state-owned-enterprises.
In a separate article, Mr. Gardner continued his discussion of Mubarak’s successful stabilization plan, which led to the decrease of inflation rates and the budget having a surplus for the first time, prior to interest payments. The Egyptian government had promised to sell off 314 state owned companies, and while slow to action, Mr. Gardner did acknowledge the potential for massive social disruption in a state that was already besieged by internal struggles for power. It was around this time in 1995 that Egypt made obvious to the world that while it acknowledged the need for economic reform, and indeed was pursuing it wholeheartedly, it would determine its own method of achieving success, rather than relying entirely on the advice of outsiders such as the IMF. The IMF believed that because of Egypt’s sizeable trade deficit it should devalue its currency. The government was concerned about increasing the cost of imports and argued that a devaluation would offset the benefits to exporters. Mubarak was also placing his bets on the recent ‘waking up’ of the Cairo stock exchange and the hoped-for benefits this could have on the economy. Essentially, in 1994 a Capital Markets Law went into effect that jolted the Cairo Stock Market into a growth spurt. Over the course of 1994 and into the first half of 1995, the value of Cairo stocks increased by over 150 percent. As Egypt moved forward with its privatization schemes an increase in liquidity and demand occurred, thus further benefiting the market. The ultimate goals were that this market-economy stimulation would encourage and increase the 1995 levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
The halfway point of 1995 saw a resurgence of violence after a brief lull that had officials hoping they had begun to turn the trend of terrorism. The targets on both sides of the battle were cruelly more and more vicious as the police began targeting specific regions that seemed to be nesting grounds for this particular breed of Islamist, and the troops of the al’ Gamaa al’ Islamiyaa were carefully targeting businesses, secular writers and journalists, the tourist industry, and the police in an effort to shake up both the government and its supporters. The government, unfazed by the bloody destruction occurring in the streets and in the rural areas, simply crimped down harder and continued with its aggressive assault. Despite the cries and pleadings of human rights organizations worldwide, Mubarak seemed to be declaring in a ruthless and decisive manor that he would control his domain and he would stamp out the violence that permeated the fiber of life in Egypt.
His regime’s determination to win in the end was blatantly apparent to the world. IN a Newsweek article by Christopher Dickey, the repressive efforts of Egypt were compared to Algeria and pointed out one thing, that in the short term repressive efforts work, but in the long run repression doesn’t get to the root of radicalism. North Africa will never have stability, Dickey argued, without economic growth, political stability, and a respect for human rights. I doubt that any would disagree with Mr. Dickey’s assessment, however perhaps in a nation torn by violence, that has a history of instability, the repression is necessary in order to implement the appropriate reforms to achieve economic and then political stability. Once those goals have been achieved and seated in the daily lives of the populace perhaps attention can the be turned to human rights and the slow withdrawal of the iron first that held the violence at bay. The first goal, however, is to successfully repress the terrorism and achieve some margin of peace for the people who live there. President Mubarak continued along this path for the remainder of 1995. Steadily his government sought out and quashed Islamist militant groups. The fervor with which this was done increased dramatically as Mubarak survived his third assassination attempt during a state visit to Sudan.
As the National Democratic Party slowly stemmed the tide of terror, more attention was shifted to the economic situation which would not be as easy to manipulate to the governments will. In mid-1995 the Economist released its findings on the state of unemployment in Egypt, which remained oppressively high. According to the Economist “some 500,000 youngsters enter the job market each year, and find mighty little to do. College graduates are left high and dry, hunting for a cleaning job; even a no-hope post in government service means hanging about on the ministry’s doorstep for ten years or so.” Egypt may have cut population growth from 2.7 percent a year to 2.2 percent since 1985, but it has close to 60 million people, half of the under the age of 21.” The article continues to say, “sure, Egypt’s economic indicators are bright, but economists reckon that it would take a sustained growth rate of seven percent or more to soak up the new job-seekers.” The manner in which Mubarak wrapped up 1995 and moved towards the next millennium would indicate that he was fully cognizant of what was required to turn Egypt’s economy completely around.
The remainder of 1995 included a renewed partnership with the Untied States to continue to promote the privatization process and to encourage job creation; a steady flow of public offers which led to the privatization of six companies, which potentially set the region up for a stock market boom. It also saw the FDI of large western companies like Benetton and Oracle software. Egypt’s textile industry also had a banner year as a result of good weather and market conditions; exports of cotton fabrics increased 90.4 percent. An article in The Banker towards the end of 1995 reported tha the IMF continued to push Egypt to speed up the process of its reforms. In spite of this Egypt’s cautious approach to reform seemed vindicated. Government finances had been brought under control thanks to more efficient tax and customs gathering and better targeting of subsidies. The budget deficit at the fiscal year-end in June was spot-on the 1.5 percent IMF target. There had been a worrying blip when inflation rates rose about 10 percent at the beginning of the year, but that fell to 9.4 percent by March of 1995. Resulting interest rates of 1.5 to 2 percent were sufficient enough to encourage savings. Even though Egypt’s slow pace of reform led to a delay in defining an IMF agreement and delayed a four billion dollar tranche of debt relief beyond the year-end deadline, there was no compelling evidence that left to its own devices the pound would sink. “The most remarkable feature of the economy,” the article went on, “is the extent to which it is being driven by domestic resources, fuelled by the savings of more than two million Egyptians in the diaspora, principally the Peninsula.”
The 1995 economy of Egypt was also marked by huge strides in the oil industry. Mid-1995 Egypt awarded seven exploration and production licenses for foreign oil companies, it also saw the opening of Egypt’s first privately owned refinery (also the biggest Arab-Israeli joint project). The year was marked by significant oil discoveries. Enough reserves of natural gas were located to enable Egypt to begin to export oil to other nations, primarily Israel, for the first time.

 

[Jr_Bullit]

The November 1995 parliamentary elections in Egypt indicated the growing public demand for participation in the nation’s political process. For the 444 seats, 3,989 candidates competed. The campaigns witnessed large-scale violence and huge expenditures, with one billion Egyptian pounds spent on the elections. The National Democratic Party won 417 seats, Wafd 6, Tagammu 4, the Liberals 1, Nasserists 1, and the Independents 14.
The political opposition charged that the elections were marred by widespread fraud and they instituted a lawsuit questioning the results. In February of 1996 a high-ranking Egyptian court issued a verdict as to the legitimacy of the elections on over 95 MPs, finding the MPs to be legitimate but the electoral process to be fraudulent. In his inaugural speech before the parliament, President Mubarak shrugged of the accusations from the outlawed and legitimized Islamic parties, of electoral rigging and insisted that the NDP won only because it represented the majority of Egyptians and that Islamists lost because of their association with militant groups. Mubarak praised the full participation of all political forces (who had boycotted the previous elections of 1990) and called on them to drop the allegations of fraud. The president insisted that the political powers should turn over a new leave so as to be able to move ahead with the democratic march of the nation.
The crackdown by the NDP throughout 1995 and especially just before the November/December elections on Islamic Fundamentalist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, coupled with the allegations of fraud point to the distance Egypt had yet to go to be considered a legitimate democracy. More important was the deliberate smudging of the distinction of publicly violent and non-violent Islamic organizations.

 

[Jr_Bullit]

1996 continued and further clarified the economic and social trends that emerged during 1995. Egypt picked up the pace of its privatization efforts. Much of Egypt’s remaining undeveloped land, including the coast and desert areas, was quickly swooped up and put to good, economic use. Ventures such as condominium and housing developments coupled with amenities for the wealthy, upper classes such as golf courses and swimming pools were put into place. An article in the Economist mourned the damage done to Egypt’s few environmentally-at-risk coral reefs and beaches and discussed the widening gap between the rich and the poor as these new developments calmly shouldered aside the mid-to-lower income classes.
The economic boom continued with a steady development of Egypt’s oil reserves along the Nile Delta. Throughout 1996 discoveries of new natural gas fields continued to fill the headlines as well as fill the accounting ledgers of the Egyptian government, who was planning for the eventual slow and steady withdrawal of foreign aid as the economy continued to improve.
An article in the Journal of Management Development analyzed the reform path that Egypt embarked on in 1991 and continued to expand and improve upon into the mid-1990s. Its assessment was that the reform measurements for state-owned-enterprises were currently in place were primarily short term in nature, designed to help improve the performance and salability of the companies. The long-term objectives were to help the companies reach export markets through quality assurance programs. The assessment of the report was that achievements in this area were still modest and it would take time for the potential of the state-owned enterprises to be fully realized as a result of weak management. The overall tone of the report was, however, positive considering the successes Egypt had achieved throughout the previous year, if at its own designated pace.
In an IMF report released in mid-1997 it was found that Egypt’s fiscal adjustment from 1990 to 1996 was enormous, “among the highest in recent experience.” The report did a brief comparison to other OECD countries, which placed in perspective the magnitude of the Egyptian effort. It says that McDermott and Westcott define a “large” fiscal action as an improvement of at least 1.5 percentage points in the primary structural government balance over two years, and a successful fiscal adjustment is defined as a reduction of at least 3 percentage points in the ration of gross public debt to GDP by the second year after the end of the two-year fiscal tightening. “On these criteria, Egypt would easily qualify as a successful adjuster. Indeed Egypt’s adjustment in its primary deficit of 17 percentage points over four years and reduction in gross debt by about 12 percentage points over six years, comfortably surpasses the largest fiscal adjustment effort achieved by any OECD economy in recent history.” The IMF report continues to say that unlike many other reforming economies, Egypt’s financial system had emerged relatively unscathed or even strengthened by its efforts. Looking ahead, the report concludes that Egypt’s next challenges would be in building upon their newfound financial stability to achieve high-levels of real economic growth that would raise living standards, increase gainful employment opportunities and ensuring that the fruits of economic growth were shared by all strata of society.
Coupled with the encouraging economic situation, the streets of Egypt were relatively quiet through out 1996, with reports of violent bloodshed changing to reports of a new tactic by Islamic Fundamentalists: One of fighting the system legally from within rather than without. The new campaign was fought from the courtrooms of the nation in an effort to conform Egyptian society to Islamic ideals of what was morally and idealogically acceptable and correct. Violence did still continue, but in a far reduced manner than the continuous assaults of 1995. With each effort of the militants, especially when acted against the steadily growing tourist trade, the government swiftly and efficiently cracked down, maintaining its recently found reputation for an iron hand. In August of 1996 an unusual event occurred with the acquittal of three Islamists by an Egyptian military court. While members of the Muslim Brotherhood felt it was a victory against the government, others felt the acquittal was representative of the government’s satisfaction at the obvious dissention in the Brotherhood ranks. Some members of the Brotherhood essentially wanted to sit back and wait for the state to make the next move while others wanted to continue to press the government and its resolve to stamp out the Islamists. It is, perhaps, because of this dissention that 1996 appeared to be a relatively bloodless year in comparison to the three years preceding it.

 

[Jr_Bullit]

The first three-quarters of 1997 appeared to be little more than a continuation of 1996. Relatively quiet on the Islamist front while Mubarak proceeded with privatization plans and increased government wealth from the oil industry. In September of 1997 events began to change with the martial court requesting death sentences for Islamic Militants who sought refugee status in the United Kingdom, and then later when the Egyptian Minister of the Interior refused any dialogue with the members of the al Gamaa al’ Islamiyaa organization, one of the most violent and public Islamic groups within Egypt. On September 17, at one of the largest and most highly publicized trials of Egyptian terrorism, four death sentences were delivered along with numerous jail sentences of varying ranges and 25 acquittals. The next day news of a ‘fiery’ attack on none German tourists and their Egyptian bus driver surfaced along with an amateur video of the events. Witnesses said three gunmen in shirts and ties walked up and fired rifles and hurled gasoline bombs as the tourists were climbing on board their bus. The police blamed a deranged gunman, but this was to be an beginning to a bloody sequence of events that would characterize the remaining months of 1997.
Tourists cautiously returned to their activities in the days that followed, reassured by police that he bus incident was a stand-alone occurrence, and the government was well in control. However, in October, following the trial of another militant al’ Gamaa al’ Islamiyaa member, terrorists were reported to have killed eleven policemen in Minya. This brought immediate reprisal from the government’s military forces, but seemed to lead to one additional horrendous event. With the assailants of the German tourist group sentenced to death at the end of October came the slaughter of 71 tourists and many more wounded in November at the famous archaeological site of Luxor. State television blamed Islamic Militants who were trying to topple the well-entrenched Mubarak regime, while heads of the al’ Gamaa al’ Islamiyaa were denouncing the attack and claming it had been carried out without their consent or knowledge.
It was predicted that an event of this magnitude could be a swift and killing blow to Egypt’s tourist industry. The Egyptian government responded swiftly to heighten security on all tourist and public areas while Mubarak called upon the world to work together in dealing with terrorism on all its fronts to prevent carnage such as the Luxor attacks from ever being successful again. Many of the perpetrators of the events were sought out and swiftly and publicly sentenced to death or imprisonment. Egypt Air and the tourist industry began to perform as much damage control as possible in an effort to salvage Egypt’s second largest foreign exchange earner.
In the years that followed, the violent attacks on tourism in 1997 began to fade into memory. Egypt’s thriving tourist industry has demonstrated its resiliency by bouncing back to greater levels within two years. The well-reported damage control implemented by Egyptian authorities, served to shore up public faith in the Egyptian government and limit the Luxor attack to only a single blip in what has become a reasonable stable nation of economic growth and repressed political violence and mayhem.
This steady shift in stability and public support for the Egyptian political regime can be seen in the November elections of 2000. The National Democratic Party had plenty to be nervous about going into the elections, as the Supreme Constitutional Court had ruled the 1990 and 1995 election procedures to have been unconstitutional. Meeting an old demand of the opposition parties, the Court decided that elections would be carried out in three stages to ensure that judges, and not civil servants, would observe voting everywhere.
The summer preceeding the elections could be characterized as a “nightmare” for the NDP as Mubarak had been forced to admit the nation was in a liquidity crisis and the Central Bank devalued the Egyptian pound from roughly 3.4 to 3.65 pounds to the dollar. Additionally that summer several parliamentary deputies were convicted of high-profile corruption cases. Despite the government’s best efforts, the elections took place amid massive gatherings and public protests, which generally were strictly controlled during electoral periods.
The Muslim Brotherhood won at least 15 seats in the first two rounds, and ran their first female candidate that year. Other opposition groups also obtained a small number of representative seats, and while the elections process may have been somewhat embarrassing for the ruling party, the dirty laundry that was aired did not affect its overwhelming majority power in the new parliament due to large numbers of candidates who ran as independents and then chose to join the NDP after having been elected.
Additionally, on September 26, 1999, roughly one-year prior to the parliamentary elections described above, the overwhelming majority of Egyptians demonstrated their support for Mubarak who was reinstated as president of Egypt for his fourth term. Mubarak’s popular support reflects the achievements of his policies, which have, according to Dr. Osama al’ Ghamzali Harb, impacted the everyday life of those from all areas of society. His tangible achievements include creating job opportunities through huge national projects, raising the standard of living, and improving sectors such as housing, water, electricity, communications and roads. Dr. Al’Ghazali Harb points out that the main feature of Mubarak’s policies is their strong link to national economic interests. His government’s primary target is improving vital Egyptian interests, primarily economic ones, that affect the ordinary Egyptian citizen.

 

[Jr_Bullit]

The period of time from the 2000 elections to the present day are marked by the continuing stability of the region. As Egypt appears more stable to the rest of the world, human rights’ organizations loudly cry for the removal of the iron hand practices and policies of the Mubarak regime and to lighten up on the repression of the Islamic Militants. However, no matter how stable and secure the region may currently appear in comparison to its bloody and war-torn neighbors, Egypt must still balance the needs of the religious Islamic groups with its continuing advances towards modernization, a process vehemently opposed to by even the most moderate of Islamic organizations irregardless of the societal benefits that are now being felt and perceived by the majority of the Egyptian populace.

Conclusion:
The war against terrorism that rages across the Middle East and North African regions has drawn massive attention and support, in recent years, of Western nations because of the aggressive campaigns against the United States and other powerful states who Islamic Fundamentalists represent the root of the evil they hope to purge from their existence. The Mubarak’s regime is in whole-hearted support of the assistance of the West in the continuing struggle against terrorism. The method and manner of dissent in Egypt has changed dramatically since the violence of 1995 that had been related to the war torn example set by Algeria. However, the battles of Egypt are not yet complete. Egypt and its peoples are still deep within the process of re-defining themselves and finding a way of coming to terms with both their religious morals and ideals and fully participating in the economic global society. Mubarak has brought the nation of Egypt to a point economically where the members of his society have faith that the improvements they have begun to experience will continue. Because of the improvements in the quality of life, the angry and bitter violence that shook the foundations of Egypt and challenged leaders throughout the 20th century have begun to abate and the voices that remain want to participate in their government without risking the loss of all that they have achieved. The process of reform, reevaluation, redefining itself in Egypt cannot be complete until the World Views of the nation come to terms with the changes in their Life Structures and how they interrelate to the rest of the global community. The process however, no longer has a need to be as violent. The largest risk faced by Mubarak in dealing with his Islamist opponents is their decision to continue to follow the examples set by similar groups in other nations, rather than charting their own course as their leader has demonstrated he is willing to do.

 

[LordOpie]

Jr_Bullit, I've grown fond of you via your posts... no way in hell i'm reading all that

For one thing, I have school work due too, but if you want to post a paper in the future and I have time, i'll definitely read it, but could you just "attach" a word file next time. It'd be easier, i think.

Good luck! (not that you need it.)

 

[valve bouncer]

An excellent appraisal mate. Needs some editing work of course. Your writing style is fluid though I question some word choice. Depending on your professor I think you may need to be somewhat more forceful in your opinions throughout the piece. It read quite neutral which is fine for the New York Times or whatever but I think uni professors might be looking for something a bit more, well, controversial. I somewhat disagree with your conclusion, I think Egypt is a bit of a time bomb and because it is the pivotal player in the region any meltdown will reverbarate further than just the Middle East. But that aside I thought it was an interesting read. Well done.

 

[Jr_Bullit]

Valve,

Thanks for your assessment...and I pretty much wholeheartedly agree...lol...Considering I threw that entire sucker together in 48 hours, and I've never forayed into the world of the Middle East prior to now, I don't think it's horrible but it's definitely one of my worst works of art. It's fortunate that this is NOT to be an "opinionated" paper, unless my opinion directly reflects that of my professor who, based upon his notes on my outline and summary statements to him throughout the quarter has never truly spent much time on Egypt but instead sticks to his areas of expertise within the region.

I'm going to noodle a bit on your opinion of Egypt being one of the pivotal players in the area and get back to you tomorrow after I've gotten some sleep . If I try to respond right now, I'll probably talk in circles and never come to any point whatsoever. lol.

 

[Jr_Bullit]

Originally posted by LordOpie
but could you just "attach" a word file next time. It'd be easier, i think.

Lol...I guess I didn't realize I could attach a word document to a post...and I didn't have access to an online location to post it and then send everyone a link. And honestly, I can't say I blame you for not wanting to read that rather wordy summation of Egypt

Now then...off to finish that blasted bibliography that's taking the entire day....

Good luck! (not that you need it.)

 

[Dragon]

gckk......brainfreeze......

 

[$tinkle]

might have to slightly adjust the content of the first few posts now:
http://news.yahoo.com/islamist-morsi-wins-egypt-presidential-vote-143750771.html