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Shit that happens with Airlines, thread

Pesqueeb

bicycle in airplane hangar
Feb 2, 2007
40,137
16,532
Riding the baggage carousel.

Jm_

sled dog's bollocks
Jan 14, 2002
18,850
9,556
AK
The human factors failures are huge. System pushed down magnitudes stronger than Boeing reported. When the system did that and pushed the nose over, the only way to manually retrim is to “unload” the tail by pushing the nose further down, which is very much the opposite of what any reasonable person would expect or want to do. Re-engaging the electric trim would result in more nose-down pitch events. Then the whole reason it was doing this was to prevent a stall, which was being predicated on one erroneous instrument rather than looking to see if multiple instruments agreed first, and then the system that should have shown two indicators were disagreeing or that one was erroneous was “optional” and not functional. Huge failures. Thats just my perspective as someone who has studied human factors engineering/ergonomics at the graduate level.
 
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StiHacka

Compensating for something
Jan 4, 2013
21,560
12,504
In hell. Welcome!

Nearly two decades before Boeing’s MCAS system crashed two of the plane-maker’s brand-new 737 MAX jets, Stan Sorscher knew his company’s increasingly toxic mode of operating would create a disaster of some kind. A long and proud “safety culture” was rapidly being replaced, he argued, with “a culture of financial bullshit, a culture of groupthink.”

 

Pesqueeb

bicycle in airplane hangar
Feb 2, 2007
40,137
16,532
Riding the baggage carousel.

Nearly two decades before Boeing’s MCAS system crashed two of the plane-maker’s brand-new 737 MAX jets, Stan Sorscher knew his company’s increasingly toxic mode of operating would create a disaster of some kind. A long and proud “safety culture” was rapidly being replaced, he argued, with “a culture of financial bullshit, a culture of groupthink.”

MCAS had been a big secret, largely kept from Boeing’s own test pilots, mentioned only once in the glossary of the plane’s 1,600-page manual, left entirely out of the 56-minute iPad refresher course that some 737-certified pilots took for MAX certification, and—in a last-minute edit—removed from the November 7 emergency airworthiness directive the Federal Aviation Administration had issued two weeks after the Lion Air crash, ostensibly to “remind” pilots of the protocol for responding to a “runaway stabilizer.” Most pilots first heard about MCAS from their unions, which had in turn gotten wind of the software from a supplementary bulletin Boeing sent airlines to accompany the airworthiness directive.
Sweet baby fucking jesus........:fie:
 

Toshi

Harbinger of Doom
Oct 23, 2001
38,029
7,549

The engineers who created the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight-control system more than a decade ago for the military refueling plane designed the system to rely on inputs from multiple sensors and with limited power to move aircraft's nose, the Journal said on.wsj.com/2mOypqT.


The newspaper cited one person familiar with the design saying this approach was taken in order to guard against the system acting erroneously or causing a pilot to lose control.

In contrast, the version of MCAS on the 737 MAX passenger plane relied on input from just one of two sensors which measure the angle at which the plane’s nose is flying, the newspaper said.
 

rideit

Bob the Builder
Aug 24, 2004
23,055
11,298
In the cleavage of the Tetons
FWIW, Frontier bent over backwards to make one of the most painful days of my life more tolerable. Got me wheelchairs, changed to the biggest seats they had, whisked my through TSA, and wheeled me to the SLC baggage claim. They really couldn’t have been nicer.