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who's had a polygraph?

moff_quigley

Why don't you have a seat over there?
Jan 27, 2005
4,402
2
Poseurville
I was administered a Poly by a CIA employee. I was in process for getting an internship with the CIA while in school. The guy was a nutcase as far as I was concerned. Kept asking me the same questions over and over and really grilled me on a few. He'd leave for 10-15 minutes at a time then start up again. He told me that I'd probably have to take it again if they were to offer me an internship as he wasn't satisfied with a couple of my answers. I didn't get the internship anyway.
 

MountainDrew

Monkey
Aug 15, 2007
471
0
Interesting conversation going on. Reminds me of the time the cops put a bowl on the criminals head, ran wires to the copy machine, and every time he answered the question, they make a copy of a page that said "LIAR"
 

Reactor

Turbo Monkey
Apr 5, 2005
3,976
1
Chandler, AZ, USA
Poly is not an exact science, and is not 100% accurate. The accuracy of poly depends on the operator skill. The person doing my poly did about 400 a year and was very good.

The polygraph depends on the stress you feel when lying or being deceptive. A psychopath who feels no stress from lying can pass a polygraph while lying his/her ass off. On the other hand a person feels guilty, even if answering truthfully, can fail test just because their stress level rises. A bad operator can make the situation worse by causing more stress for the subject.

A polygraph isn't 100% reliable, but nothing is.
 

syadasti

i heart mac
Apr 15, 2002
12,690
290
VT
A polygraph isn't 100% reliable, but nothing is.
The national academy of science specifically calls it invalid for government workers, so yes its a waste of time and money.

National Academy of Science said:
Conclusions and Recommendations

We have reviewed the scientific evidence on the polygraph with the goal of assessing its validity for security uses, especially those involving the screening of substantial numbers of government employees. Overall, the evidence is scanty and scientifically weak. Our conclusions are necessarily based on the far from satisfactory body of evidence on polygraph accuracy, as well as basic knowledge about the physiological responses the polygraph measures. We separately present our conclusions about scientific knowledge on the validity of polygraph and other techniques of detecting deception, about policy for employee security screening in the context of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories, and about the future of detection and deterrence of deception, including a recommendation for research.
 

Reactor

Turbo Monkey
Apr 5, 2005
3,976
1
Chandler, AZ, USA
The national academy of science specifically calls it invalid for government workers, so yes its a waste of time and money.

What do you propose in it's place?

No, I'm not defending polygraphs, I hate them, and almost failed mine simply because I have a guilt complex.

Where I work nine out of ten job applicants fail the combination of background check and polygraph. And these are people who know they are going to be investigated, and know they are going to have a polygraph.
 

syadasti

i heart mac
Apr 15, 2002
12,690
290
VT
What do you propose in it's place?
Standard interviewing and background checks like any other HR agency. I'm not a psychologist - the government should consult with leading members of that scientific community if they want a revised valid testing solution.

Just because they've been doing it so long isn't a good reason to continue using a flawed test without merit. Its a huge waste of tax dollars.
 

$tinkle

Expert on blowing
Feb 12, 2003
14,591
6
i don't think anyone believes poly's are used to convict, or even indict. but rather to reveal deception & associated personnel risk. like any project - cleared or not - if you cross a risk threshold, you wave off.

i don't see this as any different.
 

Reactor

Turbo Monkey
Apr 5, 2005
3,976
1
Chandler, AZ, USA
Standard interviewing and background checks like any other HR agency. I'm not a psychologist - the government should consult with leading members of that scientific community if they want a revised valid testing solution.

Just because they've been doing it so long isn't a good reason to continue using a flawed test without merit. Its a huge waste of tax dollars.

Unfortunately people do a lot of things that don't show up on a background check. Gang affiliation, undiscovered crimes, lying to employers, gambling debts et. al. These people are unsuitable for law enforcement or high security work, but traditional techniques would not find them.

People interviewing other people are actually worse than a coin flip at telling when someone is lying. A different study show that the more convinced someone was in their ability to tell when a subject was lying, the worse they actually performed. The average person was less than 50% reliable.
 

syadasti

i heart mac
Apr 15, 2002
12,690
290
VT
Its a useless waste of tax payer's money. Ask any psychology professor who has researched them. Or how about a retired FBI polygraph expert:

CQ.com said:
Drew Richardson, one of the FBI’s top polygraph experts... “I would say placing any significance on an examinee passing some portion or all portions on eight out of 15 CQT polygraph exams with all exams having covered the same subject(s) is, in a word, insane.”

CQT stands for “control question test,” a widely used technique, even with FBI job applicants, in which the polygraph examiner supposedly gets a baseline reading of the subject’s truthfulness by asking questions such as “Is your name [whatever it is]” and others where a subject is expected to lie.

Richardson famously boasted in the mid-1990s that it took him about 20 minutes to teach his 12-year-old son how to beat the test.
As an agent of the FBI for 25 years and a scientist in the FBI Laboratory, Dr. Richardson has been involved with numerous major criminal and terrorist investigations, has examined evidence in some 2,000 cases, has conducted and published research, and has testified as an expert witness approximately 100 times in federal, state, local and various international courts.

...

Dr. Richardson holds a BA degree in Chemistry from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Phi Beta Kappa). He obtained a Master of Forensic Science from the George Washington University and a PhD in Physiology through study at the George Washington Medical Center.

Dr. Richardson’s career with the FBI has included: Special Agent, Chicago Division; Supervisory Special Agent, Laboratory Examiner, Chemistry-Toxicology Unit; Supervisory Special Agent, Research Physiologist, Forensic Science Research Unit; Chief, Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU); Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI Laboratory; Senior Program Manager, Investigational Response and Administrative Sections. Dr. Richardson has had his research published in numerous scientific journals over the years and has given many lectures at law enforcement and professional scientific meetings.
 

AngryMetalsmith

Business is good, thanks for asking
Jun 4, 2006
21,250
10,207
I have no idea where I am
Stay relaxed and calm, but every time you answer a question look only at the administrator's ear, always the same ear. Eventually he'll start feeling uncomfortable.

This works, try it out with the next random person you have a conversation with.
 

DirtMcGirk

<b>WAY</b> Dumber than N8 (to the power of ten alm
Feb 21, 2008
6,379
1
Oz
I've taken a couple for work related stuff.
Just believe your own bull****, or think about something true and transpose that truth to the question you're lying on.
 

Zutroy

Turbo Monkey
Dec 9, 2004
2,443
0
Ventura,CA
They ask the same questions multiple time and multiple different ways to try and see a pattern.

My experience it's more of and art than a science. Good poly examiners are better lie detectors than the actually documented technique. Most of the computer systems have algorithms that give a % number that you're being deceptive. I have pretty good luck faking out the computer, but one guy I've worked with would nail me every time even when they computer said there was no chance i was lying.

So take it was you will, i know the guy in Langley who don't like to be talked about use them a bunch, but more as another way to stress people than actually for the data.
 

andykee

Chimp
Mar 19, 2007
13
0
san diego, ca
lifestyle as well as several "lesser" versions



don't look at polygraph evasion material, you might be asked about that while strapped to "the execution machine"
 

Reactor

Turbo Monkey
Apr 5, 2005
3,976
1
Chandler, AZ, USA
Its a useless waste of tax payer's money. Ask any psychology professor who has researched them. Or how about a retired FBI polygraph expert:
That quote is more questioning FBI policy, saying that the FBI is not setting the bar high enough; not that polygraphs don't work.

Polygraphs work, not perfectly, and they shouldn't be used routinely, and shouldn't be used for criminal/judicial purposes.

It is totally appropiate to use it as an employment screening device in conjunction with a background investigation and drug test for people who will work in a security or law enforcement environment. If it fails to catch someone, you're no worse off than if you didn't use it. If it catches a some of people that passed a background check and would have had access to classified information, or law enforcement powers, you've potentially prevented a very nasty situation.

Where I work, there are over 3000 employees and we've all had polygraphs. Nine out of ten people fail the combination of drug/polygraph/background check. Of those 3-4 out of ten fail in polygraph. The polygraph is strictly use for pre-employment screening and investigations and use of information obtained from the polygraph, or information discussed during it, is strictly prohibited from being used in a criminal case. Most (9 out of 10) of the people failing the test confess after being caught. One girl failed a question about drug use. After being told she failed, she told the examiner she was nervous about the test so she smoked a joint before coming in. I can't say how many people are able to "beat the box", but knowing the people I work with I suspect it isn't many.
 

syadasti

i heart mac
Apr 15, 2002
12,690
290
VT
I'm sorry but the NAS study clearly states you are wrong. They have much more authority on the subject than you or me - huge waste of tax payer money - end of story...

We have reviewed the scientific evidence on the polygraph with the goal of assessing its validity for security uses, especially those involving the screening of substantial numbers of government employees. Overall, the evidence is scanty and scientifically weak.
 

Reactor

Turbo Monkey
Apr 5, 2005
3,976
1
Chandler, AZ, USA
I'm sorry but the NAS study clearly states you are wrong. They have much more authority on the subject than you or me - huge waste of tax payer money - end of story...
Sounds like you bought into some anti-polygraph site's line of bull without properly researching the issue, and latched onto one misquote. The NAS study clearly states that I am right, and polygraph is the best alternative for pre-employment screening.


Here is the problem, filling sensitive jobs:

However, there have been instances where so much derogatory information is obtained that it becomes impossible to fill positions. Dickson (1986) described a program combining polygraphs with background investigations used in screening police applicants. Of the 2,711 applicants screened with this program, 1,626 (60 percent) were rejected, many of whom had committed serious felony crimes. .
NAS's beef is more with the idea of bulk screenings of existing employees; They simply don't think it's cost effective. In part because it isn't an exact science and will result in false positives. In a National Security environment you risk throwing out very expensive good employees with a few bad. The science and rational is very similar to medical screening tests, if a screening test returns a 10% false positive rate it's useless as a medical screening test because it will return hundreds of times as many false positives as true positives.

With a polygraph setting thresholds low lets too many "bad" people pass, setting the high identifies too many "good" people as "bad". On the other hand using it in a pre-employment setting isn't nearly as expensive. First you haven't invested in the potential employee in any meaningful way, and your loss is very low.


From the National Academy of Science report titled "Polygraph and Lie Detection, 2003:

THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION
Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph

Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences
and

Committee on National Statistics

Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

Psychophysiological testing, like all diagnostic activities, involves using specific observations to ascertain underlying, less readily observable, characteristics. Polygraph testing, for example, is used as a direct measure of physiological responses and as an indirect indicator of whether an examinee is telling the truth. Claims about the quantity or attribute being measured are scientifically justified to the degree that the measures are reliable and valid with respect to the target quantities or attributes.


Specifically on pre-employment/employment screenings.

The costs per false positive are much lower for preemployment screening than for periodic employee screening. In preemployment screening, there is a cost to the government of hiring less qualified people and a cost to an applicant of not getting a desired job. Unless the skills sought are very specialized, the government costs will be small. The costs to an applicant include bad feelings from failing the polygraph and the need to search for a different job. Costs are much higher in employee screening because national security jobs by their nature rely on specific human capital that must be learned on the job. For an employee who has not committed any serious security violations and who has settled into a social setting and learned many skills specific to his or her job, the costs to the government of putting that employee in some state of limbo involve training a replacement and perhaps damage to national security caused by the replacement of a valuable contributor with an inexperienced one. The costs to the employee include bad feelings, a waste of job-specific skills and knowledge, and perhaps a search for a new, probably inferior job. The costs to the government will be higher if there are negative side effects on morale or productivity of coworkers or on the ability to attract potentially productive employees.
Here they say polygraph is better than any alternative.

Some potential alternatives to the polygraph show promise, but none has yet been shown to outperform the polygraph. None shows any promise of supplanting the polygraph for screening purposes in the near term. Some potential alternatives may be useful as supplements, though the necessary research to explore that potential has not been done. Some, particularly techniques based on measurement of brain activity through electrical and imaging studies, have good potential on grounds of basic theory. However, research is at a very early stage with the most promising techniques, and many methodological, theoretical, and practical problems would have to be solved for these techniques to yield improvements on the polygraph. Not enough is known to tell whether it will ever be possible in practice to identify deception in real time through brain measurements.
 

syadasti

i heart mac
Apr 15, 2002
12,690
290
VT
No you got the information from the same website I got the quote from (NAP.edu), but I presented the conclusion of the report. Its a useless gimmick.

The conclusion clearly states what I quoted. It goes on to say:

Basic Science

Polygraph Accuracy Almost a century of research in scientific psychology and physiology provides little basis for the expectation that a polygraph test could have extremely high accuracy. The physiological responses measured by the polygraph are not uniquely related to deception. That is, the responses measured by the polygraph do not all reflect a single underlying process: a variety of psychological and physiological processes, including some that can be consciously controlled, can affect polygraph measures and test esults. Moreover, most polygraph testing procedures allow for uncontrolled variation in test administration (e.g., creation of the emotional climate, selecting questions) that can be expected to result in variations in accuracy and that limit the level of accuracy that can be consistently achieved.

Theoretical Basis The theoretical rationale for the polygraph is quite weak, especially in terms of differential fear, arousal, or other emotional states that are triggered in response to relevant or comparison questions. We have not found any serious effort at construct validation of polygraph testing.

Research Progress Research on the polygraph has not progressed over time in the manner of a typical scientific field. It has not accumulated knowledge or strengthened its scientific underpinnings in any significant manner. Polygraph research has proceeded in relative isolation from related fields of basic science and has benefited little from conceptual, theoretical, and technological advances in those fields that are relevant to the psychophysiological detection of deception.

Future Potential The inherent ambiguity of the physiological measures used in the polygraph suggest that further investments in improving polygraph technique and interpretation will bring only modest improvements in accuracy.
Recent Policy Recommendations on Polygraph Screening Two recent reports that advocate continued use of polygraph tests for security screening in federal agencies are partly, but not completely, consistent with the scientific evidence on polygraph accuracy. The Hamre Commission report recommends more restricted use in DOE; the Webster Commission report (Commission for the Review of FBI Security Programs, 2002) recommends expanded polygraph testing in the FBI. Both reports recommend using the polygraph only on individuals who are in positions where they could gravely threaten national security, a stance consistent with the objective of reducing the total costs of false positive errors in testing.

Both reports presumably based their recommendations at least in part on a belief in the utility of the polygraph that goes beyond issues regarding the scientific validity and accuracy.

Neither report explicitly addresses two inherent problems of using a test with the approximate accuracy of the polygraph for screening in populations with very low base rates of spies and terrorists. One is the false positive problem created by the likelihood that the great majority of positive test results will come from innocent examinees. The other, potentially more serious problem, is the false negative problem created by the likelihood that with polygraph screening programs such as are being operated at both DOE and FBI, which yield a very low proportion of negative results, the majority of spies are likely to &#8220;pass&#8221; at least one polygraph test without being detected, even if they do not use countermeasures. Thus, as we note above, a policy of screening that may be justified on the basis of utility for deterrence and elicitation of admissions cannot be counted on to detect more than a small proportion of major security violators.

Federal officials need to be careful not to draw the wrong conclusions from negative polygraph test results. Our discussions with polygraph program and counterintelligence officials in several federal agencies suggest that there is a widespread belief in this community that someone who &#8220;passes&#8221; the polygraph is &#8220;cleared&#8221; of suspicion. Acting on such a belief with the results of security screening polygraph tests could pose a danger to national security because a negative polygraph test result in a population with a low base rate, especially when the test protocol produces a very small percentage of positive test results, provides little information on deceptiveness beyond what was already known prior to the test, that the probability of true transgression is very low.
 

Zutroy

Turbo Monkey
Dec 9, 2004
2,443
0
Ventura,CA
The thing that most people miss is that, most of the time when the DOE, FBI, and the like use polys for security, the poly results themselves aren't what they are looking for. They're trying to shake people up, knock them off there game, make them nervous, so they're more likely to make mistakes, give the rest of the counter efforts more to work with.